y remarks are
going to be a variation on Louis Hartz’s Liberal
Tradition in America, still to my mind the basic
text on political culture in the United States, though
it needs a lot of amendment, some of which I will offer
here. If the pre-modern culture of Europe was the
Ancien Regime, then modern culture, starting with
the Enlightenment, or the 17th Century Revolution in
England, comes as a rebellion against it. So in Germany
after World War I, for example, both the socialist
Liebknecht and the liberal Max Weber, running for the
presidency as a Liberal, had roughly the same attitude
toward conservative Catholicism in Germany: it was an
accomplice of the class enemy, or it was the cultural
enemy, depending on which of them you asked.
If Hartz is
right about the United States, though, and an
egalitarian liberal individualism is its foundation (as
Tocqueville, of course, said long before Hartz), then in
one of its forms at least rebellion quite logically
comes as a version of anti-modern conservatism. (I’m
talking
about mass rebellion here, not the arcane rebellion of
post-structuralist academics). And since the political
institutions of liberalism are virtually
unchallengeable—and have not really been challenged by
the new conservatism—this comes mostly as a rebellion in
the realm of culture. This is the real counter-culture;
it renders comprehensible such factoids as that in the
U.S. roughly eighty percent or more of respondents call
themselves regular church-goers, whereas in Britain the
comparable figure is below ten percent. One doesn’t
imagine that you could have anywhere in U.S. an
experience comparable to the one I had walking through
the old quarter in Amsterdam, where one abandoned church
was a center for avant-garde art, and across the street
from it were naked hookers in a storefront window.
So what I
want to do to begin is describe this
counter-Enlightenment, for that is what it is, with one
pregnant addition. It certainly hasn’t replaced
classical American liberalism, but it contends for power
with it; and now it has welded together its own
anti-modernism with a political strategy imported by
ex-Trotskyite and ex-Leninist intellectual savants.
Together they now look not just to struggle with
liberalism but to wipe it out—along with, of course, all
variants to the Left of liberalism. This is where my
theme of counter-Enlightenment meets the more specific
theme of “neo-conservative strategies.”
At the root of
neo-conservatism is the naked power approach to
politics, heralded by the ex-Trotskyite James Burnham in
his influential book The Machiavellians: Defenders of
Freedom, shortly after WWII. Burnham and his
followers at first produced a political theory and
eventually a political practice of what are, supposedly,
competing elitisms: the conservative elitism of say
Mosca, Michels, and Pareto against the radical elitism
of Lenin, Gramsci, Marcuse, Althusser et al. In
either case, the so-called “people” are, according to
this theory’s proponents, necessarily excluded from any
real say in political life. The theory became practice
especially in the work and activism of Irving Kristol,
the godfather of neo-conservatism, who in the 1970s in
an influential essay—perhaps the most influential essay
written in the 20th century United States—addressed
corporate leaders and foundation heads on the necessity
of taking steps to defend capitalism against the Left by
explicitly funding right-wing theorizing and activism.
Note that in Kristol’s politics, as in all
neo-conservative political theory, “the people” existed
only to be manipulated, by someone or other; this
assumption has become the ideological underpinning of
all neo-conservative activity since.
Most
especially, from the standpoint that there is nothing to
politics but the clash of elites, the denial by liberals
that they are a controlling elite at all is itself
inflammatory, and fuels the biggest lie of the late 20th
century, the lie that undergirds contemporary
neo-conservatism and pseudo-populism both: the lie of
“liberal control of the media.” From the
neo-conservative standpoint, there must be some
political elite in control of any important institution,
and since they know they are not in control of
network television or the national prestige newspapers,
it must be liberals who are. What has happened now—the
disaster that has happened—has been the conjunction of
this political theory of naked elite power, with the
counter-Enlightenment: the anti-modern, ideological
fanaticism of the religious right.
To return now
to the more traditional counter-Enlightenment, I’m going
to contrast its cognitive map with that of liberal
Enlightenment. The latter needs no elaboration by me,
it’s the former that requires description. The basis of
this anti-modernism is a peculiar religiosity that can
be described as follows: religion and science are not
complementary (as with the modernized wing of the
Catholic Church) but competitive; they describe the same
phenomena, but science and reason get it wrong. This is
only the beginning, though. This religiosity is not
transcendental or abstract, but immanent, and its
immanent truths (based on Biblical literalism) are not
only empirical but more fundamentally are moral.
Moreover, the two kinds of truth are not
incommensurable, as ordinary philosophy has it, but are
as one. There is no fact-value problem. Evil, therefore,
in the religious sense—the most profound religious
sense—consists of error. Evil is not mundane or
institutional, as with Hannah Arendt, nor does it have
historical causes, as with Erich Fromm on Nazism, nor is
it one possible outcome of profound neurosis, as with
Freud, nor is it an inexplicable mystery, as with many
Christian theologians. Evil is religious error.
But if evil
consists of error then conversely, and this is the
crucial step in today’s mass irrationalism, error is
evil. To take an obvious contrast, Left critics have
always worried about the social corruption of science,
or the possibility of its being put to destructive uses,
but this is an auto-critique on their part (think of J.
Robert Oppenheimer on the H-bomb) which has as a goal
the perfection or at least improvement of science and
reason, not their destruction. Contrarily, where
religion and other forms of knowledge are competitive,
but only the former can define good and evil, then
mistaken science or analysis or opinion of any
kind—i.e., that which deviates from biblical literalism
and moral rightness—becomes evil in and of itself; not
just imperialistic, as post-structuralist critiques
would have it, but evil.
The most
important outcome of this position is that what the
psychologist Anatol Rapoport called the confrontational
style of debate (as we’ve been seeing in the Democratic
primary, for example) is replaced by the confrontational
style of the Fight. The method of debate is to
acknowledge one’s opponent’s position in the strongest
light so as to perfect one’s own (this is Mill in On
Liberty, of course). By contrast, the method of the
Fight is simply to wipe out one’s opponent, figuratively
or often, literally.
In the
context of a Fight, rational discussion is fruitless
because there is no dialogue; from the standpoint of
those engaged in it, the Fight is essentially one-sided.
For example, the long run-up to the abolition of welfare
by the Clinton administration consisted of years of
dueling studies, hypothesizations, and so forth, about
incentives, the poverty trap, the state of public
opinion, etc. Some were better and some were worse
methodologically, but they were all in the same ballpark
(see Sanford Schram’s critique, Words on Welfare,
for an account of this debate). And of course the
ballpark they were in was constructed in the 18th
century by Jeremy Bentham, the father of welfare
economics. Later amendments of his sometimes-nutty
empiricism by more sociologically oriented critics such
as Marx and Durkheim do not challenge the basis of his
anti-religious modernism: that issues of policy can be
discussed reasonably, by looking at the data. But this
is not the way spokespersons for the ruling party in the
U.S., which articulates both the neo-conservative and
the counter-Enlightenment positions, approach issues
now.
Two things
are different at this moment in time. First, though all
politicians lie, the current administration is
historically unique in that its lies consist of
proposing policies and legislative acts that secretly
have the opposite intention from their announced goals
in that ideological coherence and favors for friends are
their only purpose. Therefore, they can’t be analyzed as
to their validity or accomplishment; I don’t know of any
other historical case of this kind. Second, and perhaps
worse, careful and reputable scientific studies that
contradict arguments made by the Bush administration or
its supporters are simply suppressed or falsified:
reasoned discussion is suppressed in deference to
ideological correctness. (All of this documented in Eric
Alterman and Mark Green’s new book The Book on Bush:
How George W. Misleads America). What is
fascinating, perhaps startling, and certainly horrific,
is that in the face of this assertive irrationalism,
this know-nothingism, the neo-conservative right, that
is, the intellectual right, has either fallen silent or
joined the bandwagon. None of them speaks out against
this Americanized version of Lysenkoism, or Aryan
science. In the naked power struggle that these new
Machiavellians call politics, any lie is better than
none, and if the struggle is between good and evil, any
lie is indeed absolutely necessary. We can think of no
better example than Valerie Plame: what looks very much
like treason is committed, by someone in the White House
and by a stealth propagandist posing as a journalist,
and no one in either wing of the conservative movement
has a word of criticism to offer.
Here let me
move back again to the religious counter-Enlightenment
and speak of two current examples of contemporary
irrationalism. The first is creationism. The importance
of this phenomenon can hardly be over-emphasized. It
sweeps throughout the blue states, where in many
communities overwhelming majorities reject biological
science tout court; and even some of the red
ones. The basis of creationism is either Biblical
literalism or, worse, a wholly fraudulent “biology”
known as Intelligent Design, masquerading as science in
order to replace it. What this means is that an entire
generation of Christian (as they call themselves) young
people learns to value ideological lies over scientific
investigation. The second example, of course, is the gay
marriage hysteria. Here the materialism and rationalism
of modern thought run entirely aground. What an
economist would call perfect Pareto optimality—the apex
of welfare economics, the pursuit of a happiness that
harms no one and affects no one except those benefiting
from it—is trumped by a thinking that the rationalist
cannot even put a name to (except to denigrate it as, in
Stuart Hall’s useful phrase, a moral panic). Every
negative comment about gay marriage rests itself on the
same foundation, that our civilization is “at stake.” No
one is able to verbalize in the slightest how this might
be so. Strengthening marriage symbolically apparently
destroys it; more people undergoing the ritual of
marriage apparently destroys it; two people affirming
their commitment without benefit of a formal legal
licensing process can be compared to looting, rioting,
bestiality, and polyandry. I’m not sure whether to call
this moral panic, intellectual degradation, moral
madness, or simply evil let loose; but the result in any
event is precisely that what cannot be verbalized, an
ineffable something that has no content beyond its own
appearance, surmounts and trumps the actual, the real,
with its ineffability.
It is quite
possible that, as various optimistic commentators have
been saying, in the long run equality for gay persons is
as unstoppable, in the formal legal sense at least, as
it was for black persons in the formal legal sense; as
it’s become a cliché to point out, not forty years ago
every word that’s being said now about gay marriage was
being said about interracial marriage. That moral panic,
though—and even then it wasn’t nearly as publicly
hysterical—at least had a semi-rational basis, in that a
real social hierarchy from which millions of white
people benefited was on the way to being really
overthrown in its last legal bastion. Today the descent
into irrationality has no material social basis at all,
only an emotional basis, an obsessive ideology, a
fanaticism, posing as religion, that represents what
Mill called the most monstrous doctrine of all: that I
am injured if you behave in a way that offends me, even
if your action has no material impact on me at all. He
was right about that monstrousness. The debasing of
rational thought by millions of people, and beyond that
the acquiescence in or encouragement of that debasing by
educated and knowledgeable persons who know the
difference between hysteria and thought, chills the
blood, and suggests that the lust for power has become
unlimited. Together with the other aspects of the era
I’ve mentioned, it bespeaks an urge to what I would call
now proto-totalitarianism. It probably won’t go further
than that, because the material conditions are lacking,
but the mere similarity is terrifying.
Philip Green
is Formerly Sophia Smith Professor of Government at
Smith College, now Visiting Professor of Political
Science at the New School University Graduate Faculty,
author of
Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence;
Retrieving Democracy: In Search of Civic Equality;
Equality and Democracy; Cracks in the Pedestal: Ideology
and Gender in Hollywood,
and other books and articles; member, Editorial Board of
The Nation.
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