
olitical
commentary is always replete with exaggerations: it fits the
need of the culture industry. Even the greatest thinkers
like Karl Marx and Theodor Adorno tended to take the
experience of a crucial historical moment and extrapolate
its most dramatic implications into the future: it’s a
natural inclination. But the victory of George W. Bush in
the presidential campaign of 2004 is pregnant with the most
ominous economic, political, and ideological developments.
The onus does not simply fall on “capital” in an election
that cost nearly $4 billion and in which roughly the same
amount of cash was spent on both sides. Enough elite sectors
were suffering from a damaged economy and were appalled by
the blatantly incompetent handling of the ill-fated and
immoral invasion of Iraq. Republicans proved themselves
masters of the smear campaign and, most likely, there was
ballot-fraud in the two crucial swing states of Ohio and
Florida.
But 2004 is not 2000.
President George Bush defeated Senator John Kerry (D-Mass)
by three and a half million votes and voting reached record
highs of nearly 60%; not merely a plurality but for the
first time since 1988, when George Bush the Elder beat
Michael Dukakis, a majority of American voters made a
dramatic political choice. Staring into the abyss in the
aftermath of a sweep, which has resulted not only in greater
Republican control over the Senate and the Congress, but
what is being presented as a new right-wing ideological
mandate, the left must now look in the mirror and reflect
upon first principles. It must consider what strategy the
Democratic Party employed, what the right-wing zealots are
planning, what the role of the left might be, and what
outlines its resistance should take under conditions in
which – it should not be forgotten – the country remains
virtually as divided as it was in 2000.
*
*
*
Dealing with Differences: Could a different
candidate have produced a better result? Perhaps, but
probably not: outside of Howard Dean, who would have
received little support from the careerists within the
Democratic Party, and whom the right-wing media would have
shredded, none of the other candidates inspired much
enthusiasm. Differences between the Republican and
Democratic camps were also apparent and, in spite of a
relentless and hideous right-wing media blitz against the
challenger, the lying and incompetence of the Bush
Administration became public knowledge. But it is not that
simple. Belief once existed in the willingness of the
Democratic Party – or, at least, certain minority segments
of it – to stand for certain principles with respect to
foreign policy as well as domestic reform. That belief was
probably never fully warranted: the Democrats have been the
party of aggressive, liberal nationalism for most of the
twentieth century. Especially now, however, it has become
clear that if the party is to serve as an opposition then
pressure must come from outside or what might be termed “the
street.”
While the Republican Party ran an explicitly ideological
campaign predicated on “mobilizing the base” – by
highlighting the threat posed to moral values, raising the
specter of terrorism, wrapping the invasion of Iraq in the
flag of national interest, and invoking the fear of higher
taxes – the Democratic Party was guided by exactly the
opposite strategy. It too, of course, wished to bring out
its base. But its campaign was driven less by “liberal”
principles let alone “socialist” beliefs, which was claimed
by various reactionary and religious demagogues in the
Mid-West and the South, than by the “realism” of the
pollster and the “pragmatism” of the party professional.
They believed it was enough for John Kerry to appear as the
“anti-George Bush” just as, in the primaries, he had served
as the “anti-Howard Dean.” It would seem from the results
that the wise guys among the Democrats weren’t as smart as
they thought they were.
Asking whether a different candidate would have done
“better” then is, actually, the wrong question. More
important is to reflect upon whether this candidate
left any kind of legacy on which the Democrats might build
down the road. That is where the problem lies. Senator Kerry
presented his party as a somewhat less noxious version of
the Republicans and assumed a reactive, rather than a
proactive, stance on the major issues of our time: social
issues, the economy, nationalism, and the war. To his
credit, Kerry did unequivocally state his support for Roe v.
Wade, indicated he would not appoint reactionary justices to
the Supreme Court, and spoke about extending health care to
the 43 million people who need it.
It should have been enough of a reason to vote for him.
But elections are decided less by
issues than the mobilization of constituencies. Kerry
said little about the declining conditions of the elderly
poor and he did not offer much more to those
African-Americans who would prove his most loyal supporters.
Senator Kerry was also outflanked on the matter of gay
marriage: he opposed the constitutional ban on it demanded
by President Bush only to watch in horror as Vice-President
Dick Cheney, surely to soften the hard-line stance of his
boss, stated publicly that he didn’t see the need for an
amendment. The Democrats never articulated the vision of a
nation steeped in tolerance and acceptance of the “other,”
and ready to meet the needs of social justice in an age of
globalization.
As for the economy, Kerry was content
to oppose “tax cuts” for the rich, but not for the “middle
class”; oppose the “outsourcing” of jobs but not put forward
a plan for mass scale job creation; oppose privatizing the
social security system but not speak about raising benefits.
Intent upon developing “business friendly policies,”
Democrats split the interests of working people from those
of the “middle class” families with incomes around $60,000.
They also refused explicitly to accuse the Bush
Administration of engaging in class war even though
it had redistributed income upward from the poor to the rich
more radically than at any time during this century,
constricted union political activity and the right to
strike, and opposed raising an already pathetically low
minimum wage. Too little was made of the way in which, for
the first time during a war, programs for poor and working
people were actually eliminated.
For the Democrats, it was always less a matter of
challenging elites or reinvigorating the welfare state than
engaging in what Bill Clinton liked to call “triangulation,”
which involves standing just a wee-bit further to the left
on economic issues than the Republicans. Kerry publicly
evidenced the inner conflict of a man burdened with an
exceptionally “liberal” voting record in the Senate while
feeling the “pragmatic” necessity of running against it for
president. During the last week of the campaign, indeed, he
ultimately spoke less about a plummeting economy than the
loss of 350 tons of munitions in Iraq due to the
incompetence of the administration.
To continue: what was true in terms of social issues and
the economy became even more embarrassing in terms of
dealing with the culture generated by 9/11. Much is made now
about the role of religion, and the inability of Democrats
to deal with the faithful, but actually the number of voting
evangelicals remained roughly what it was in 2000 and it was
among non-regular churchgoers that President Bush increased
his vote.
Most voters were concerned, especially in the swing states,
with “national security” in the face of a terror attack and
the conduct of the Iraq War. Indeed, while religion and
“moral values” surely played a role,
it was the inability to deal with the insecurities
associated with the post-9/11 climate that sent the
Democrats to defeat.
Senator Kerry was effusive in his nationalism and
preoccupation with making the country more “secure”
throughout the campaign. Rather than appear as the decorated
veteran that he was, in fact, he sought to turn himself into
a war hero. Kerry threatened to “hunt down” and “kill” Osama
bin Laden and the rest of the terrorists with as much fervor
as President Bush. The only difference was that Kerry did
“flip-flop” on his past as a resister to Vietnam, remained
ambiguous on the Patriot Act, and unrealistically argued for
ending the Iraqi occupation by sending in more troops
while maintaining that he could persuade the United Nations
and our economically strapped former allies – whose citizens
overwhelmingly opposed the invasion from the beginning – to
provide “help.” The Democrats were simply not as convincing
in their obsessions with security, militarism, or
nationalism as the Republicans.
Maybe they were not quite as obsessed. This only makes
sense since, for right or wrong, the Democrats were
considered the party of opposition and they were supposed to
offer an alternative. That was, after all, their rationale
in the election of 2004. It was a rationale, however, which
they neither fully embraced nor fully discarded. Senator
Kerry criticized the set of lies that legitimated the
invasion, but never called upon the United States to exit
Iraq. Until the end of September, near the conclusion of the
campaign, he said that he would have authorized the war even
had he known that Iraq was not harboring weapons of mass
destruction. Kerry lambasted the President not for waging a
useless and immoral war, but for the incompetence with which
it was being waged. This stance left him open to the charge
of not believing in the legitimacy of the invasion while,
simultaneously, engaging in Monday-morning quarterbacking:
Kerry’s catastrophic ambivalence on legislation calling for
$87 billion to further finance the war, which he apparently
supported while voting against the bill, was symbolic of his
entire take on the conflict. That the invasion of Iraq was
misguided from the beginning – in principle and in
practice – never, ironically, became part of the
electoral debate. And for good reason: most of the Democrats
along with a new set of left wing “fellow travelers” took
the bait and – especially when it looked like victory was
near – fell over one another in expressing support for the
Iraqi war. That the cheers turned to criticism – once
victory was no longer at hand – looked hypocritical though,
tactically and pragmatically, the shift in opinion only made
sense.
Senator Kerry shied away from proposing a new approach to
foreign policy or dealing with the need for a planetary
politics in a planetary age.
The doctrine of “pre-emptive strike” was never subjected to
criticism and the loss of the “street” in so many nations,
the squandering of sympathy and support that the United
States had gained due to 9/11, was never linked to the
pursuit of a unilateral foreign policy in favor of an
explicitly multilateral one. Again and again, Kerry
disclaimed the idea that any foreign nation or organization
would hold a veto over American actions under his
presidency. The problem therefore was not that the
Democrats refused to embrace nationalism, fiscal
responsibility, the feelings of the religious right, or the
war effort; it was that they did not do any of this with the
same degree of conviction and consistency as
their Republican opponents.
Advisors to Senator Kerry like Mary Beth Cahill and Bob
Shrum along with the “mainstream” associated with the
Democratic Leadership Council wanted to be “pragmatic,”
“realistic,” and slick. They were. But the result was merely
a watered down version of the campaign that they opposed.
The contradictions and vacillations over foreign policy
became ever more glaring. The Economist was not wrong when,
while supporting Kerry, it claimed in its election issue
that the presidential race involved a choice between “the
incompetent and the incoherent.” The real lesson of this
election is not merely that the former appeared less noxious
than the latter, which it did, but that the only hope for
progressives – now irretrievably on the defensive – is to
recognize that competence requires coherence and that
progressive interests must be linked to progressive
principles.
*
*
*
Republican Plans: President Bush actually put the
matter well when he stated in his victory address that he
had now earned some “political capital” and that he was
willing to spend it. What’s coming will be, if possible, an
intensified version of what has been. The political
trajectory for the administration over the next four years
was set during the electoral campaign and it will revolve
less upon what campaign strategist Karl Rove termed “mini-ball” than the “big” issues with respect to foreign and
domestic policy. When seeking to understand this
ideologically driven Republican Party, when constructing an
image of neo-conservatism, more is subsequently involved
than discrete issues like privatizing social security,
eliminating taxes on inheritance and savings, introducing
radical tax cuts, or even repealing the Wagner and the Fair
Labor Standards Acts. Such policies would undoubtedly
increase the deficit. But man does not live by bread alone.
This would make it possible for the Republicans to justify
eliminating state programs though, naturally, not those
concerned with “national” security or further bloating an
omnivorous military budget.
Shrinking “big government” was never actually the aim of
neo-conservatives. Bush’s deficit in 2004 was $413 billion
and his military budget will run to $419 billion. Roughly $4
billion per week will be spent covering the costs generated
by Iraq and Afghanistan and the partial privatization of
Social Security could reach $146 billion by 2009. A
$258 billion budget is projected for that year without even
considering the further costs of the war in Iraq.
The point is plain enough: only in terms of cutting
welfare programs – and this often as a “stealth issue” –
were neo conservatives ever intent upon, in their parlance,
“starving the beast.” They were always more than willing to
expand the size of the military and the intelligence
agencies.
“Laissez-faire,” wrote Kevin Phillips, “is a
pretense.”
The government is now part of the economy: the real
question involves the priorities it should set. Ideology is
necessary in privileging one set of priorities over another.
Viewing the state in terms of a family budget helps provide
a basis for provincial thinking about the “fiscal
responsibility” while the vision of an imperiled community,
strengthened by the incessant terror alerts, creates the
justification for building an ever-stronger military capable
of enforcing a foreign policy consonant with imperialist
aims Those wishing to confront the Republican Party will
thus have to deal with the connections it has forged between
imperialism, militaristic nationalism, a new provincialism,
and the waging of an economic class war.
Many now speak about the dangers of American intervention
spreading to Iran, Syria and other states that are included,
or might be included, in what President Bush called “the
axis of evil.” That phrase is now already almost forgotten
but it remains important for making sense of America’s role
in the world. More is involved than the particular
flashpoints for potential crisis or even the seemingly
unending attempt to read the present back into the original
response to the attack of 9/11 and the assault on the
Taliban. Generally ignored have been the basic nationalist
and unilateralist assumptions underpinning the invasion of
Iraq that were presented by Republicans – now even more than
before – as a line of demarcation between “us and them.”
More than 56% of Americans now doubt whether the Iraqi
War is worth the costs. That number is steadily rising along
with the dead and wounded. But the election of 2004
suggested what is actually at stake is less Iraq than the
self-understanding of the United States as the
predominant world power with the God-given right to
intervene where it will. Hard to ignore is the way in which
America has lost the moral standing it acquired in the
aftermath of 9/11. Republicans turned this in their favor.
Former allies opposed to the Iraqi invasion and the
international forum in which the Bush administration
suffered its most embarrassing public setback, the United
Nations, became targets of unrelenting criticism. The need
for self-reflection by the United States and developing new
forms of western unity were transformed into an unthinking
nationalism, resentment against the rest of the world for
its ingratitude, heightened preoccupations with “security,”
and feelings of cultural superiority for leading the “war
against terrorism.” The same hot air, the same propaganda,
is now filling the trial balloons concerning the threats to
our national security posed by Iran and Syria. Why not? Such
talk helped the Republicans generate a new provincialism
within the American polity.
The Democratic Party had no response to the wave of
sentiments and attitudes reminiscent of the great character
fashioned by Sinclair Lewis: Babbitt. The new provincialism
reflects the overlapping consensus between the “middle class
and the depressed rural elements of American society. It
exhibits not only a fear of criticism, but of
expanding individual choices and legitimating different
life-styles that challenge communitarian norms and religious
strictures. It evokes the Bible thumping of the
half-literate preacher, the attempt to introduce creationism
as an “alternative” to evolution, and the thought that stem
cell research and biological engineering will alter “human
nature.”
The new provincialism is the neo-conservative response to
what Norman Podhoretz called the “adversary culture” of the
1960s. Grounded in the basic concerns of the moment –
abortion, gay marriage, and the right to own a gun (any gun)
– this parochial and reactionary ideology is ultimately
intent upon challenging the most basic elements of the
progressive tradition: cosmopolitanism and tolerance, civil
liberties and social reform, and – above all – the attempt
to constrain the arbitrary exercise of institutional
power.
Abortion was cleverly pitched in terms of a “culture of
life” for the Republican base even while George W. Bush
largely focused on “partial birth abortions” in the
presidential debates. But there is little doubt that the
Bush Administration will attempt to mitigate or even reverse
Roe v. Wade with the appointment of possibly three new
justices to the Supreme Court. The popularity of the new
provincialism also provides justification for those who
deeply resent abortion in principle and seek new
conservative legislation. Newly elected Senator David Vitner
from Louisiana has called for banning abortion in all
instances while Tom Coburn, the newly elected Senator from
Oklahoma, actually has called for arresting doctors who
perform abortions and trying them for murder should that
procedure become illegal. Similarly, the newly elected
Senator from South Carolina, Jim De Mint has made the modest
proposal that neither gays nor unmarried pregnant women
should teach in public schools.
As for gay marriage, of course, it was a stroke of
political brilliance for Republicans in eleven states to
place bans on gay marriage on the ballot: they were
universally successful. But it remains an open question
whether President Bush will fulfill his campaign promise of
seeking a constitutional ban. The price would be very high.
What is not an open issue, however, is the question of guns.
Rather than take on the National Rifle Association, whose
supporters would most likely vote Republican anyway, the
Democratic Party simply concentrated on the importance of
retaining the existing ban on AK-47s. Cries of “USA! USA!”
directed against outsiders and unbelievers, however,
did not vanish. And for good reason: The forest was missed
for the trees. Ignored was the political role of ideology in
favor of a narrow understanding of economic interests. Only
by bringing ideology back in is it possible to glean
hints of what will surely prove important not merely for
Democrats winning the next election, but for combating what
must be understood as a more general “distortion of
democracy” that pervades the American landscape. The Bush
Administration has already begun packing the lower courts
with conservatives. Three new reactionary justices on the
Supreme Court could have a devastating impact on civil
liberties no less than social issues like abortion. Then
there are the various “anti-terror” intelligence bills along
with the Patriot Acts I & II. They give new powers to the
federal government with respect to issuing subpoenas,
denying bail to those accused of terrorism, instituting the
death penalty for terrorist crimes, developing “enhanced
surveillance procedures,” sealing off borders, and “removing
obstacles to investigating terrorism.”
But the threat to democracy, no less than democracy
itself, is not simply a formal matter. It is not merely the
direct assault on civil liberties through legislation, and
various attempts at censorship, which is crucial. Just as
important is the spirit of intimidation and the
self-censorship generated in what is becoming an ever more
militaristic and provincial climate of opinion. The belief
is growing ever stronger not only that the United States has
been divinely endowed with the right to exert its power when
it wills, but that intellectual activity is an affront to
religious faith, that the political exercise of democratic
rights is an impediment to national “unity,” and that the
concern for economic justice involves an assault on the
individual. Neo-conservatives are bent upon strengthening
the military, waging imperialist wars abroad and
intensifying a class war against the least fortunate at home
under the cover of a hyper-nationalism.
Cultural reactionaries and religious fanatics, advocates of
the new provincialism, are intent upon contesting the
practice of liberty and the progress of knowledge. Support
exists not for Nazism, or for old-fashioned forms of racism
and anti-Semitism, but for a new American form of
authoritarian populism.
That is bad enough.
*
*
*
What Now? : Not since Richard Nixon defeated
Senator George McGovern (D-South Dakota) in 1972 have the
hopes of the left been so thoroughly dashed. The greatest
voting registration drive in American history, the most
remarkable fund-raising effort ever, seems to have led to
nothing for the Democrats.
They were out-mobilized by the Republicans.
Even worse: evangelical fundamentalists and those threatened
by the more liberal and cosmopolitan elements of modernity,
seem to have voted against their immediate economic
interests and in favor not merely of a radical
redistribution of wealth upwards, and an old-fashioned class
war directed against programs of benefit to working people
and the poor, but of a costly and unnecessary war in Iraq.
The country seems to have been driven even farther to the
right and it appears to stand more divided than ever before.

If the map above has any validity, however, the present
divide is not quite as “new” as it would seem. What becomes
evident is a general division between rural areas seemingly
threatened by modernity and urban areas intent upon
embracing it. This translates into a conflict between the
class and groups embedded in rural existence with its
religious and cultural traditionalism confronting the class
and groups embedded in urban life with its secularism and
multicultural dynamism.
Interestingly enough, however, there is nothing new about
that either.
Just as capitalists generally harbored an affinity for the
free markets and civil liberties associated with classical
liberalism, and workers historically identified with either
Marxism or some form of social democratic thinking, the
middle class sought refuge in the security of traditional
values while pre-modern groups including farmers and small
entrepreneurs and the like tended to identify with
pre-modern ideologies. And they did so precisely because the
modern world both in its secular – liberal and socialist –
theory as well as in its capitalist –
industrial and
technological –
practice is imperiling both the existential
and the material foundations of their pre-modern way of
life.
Herein is the source of the new provincialism. Nostalgia
for the power and glory of the American imperial past, which
was questioned during the Vietnam War, inclines rural and
pre-modern groups towards embracing nationalist propaganda
even in what is manifestly a failed cause. Fear of the
outsider, in this case the Arab not the Jew, similarly
predisposes them to appeals concerning “security” in the
face of a looming terror attack. Ironically, if such an
attack should occur, it will most likely take place not in
some small town, but in precisely the kind of major urban
area whose citizens vote “left.” Nevertheless, the new
provincialism does not merely speak to issues of foreign and
national security: it also bleeds into domestic concerns.
Most important, perhaps, is the rejection of a rights
based culture in favor of the “community.” The decline in
“family values” is bemoaned without the least sense of the
way in which “the culture industry” is undermining them. The
preoccupation with “creationism” as an alternative to
evolution by the rural, religious, parts of the citizenry
complements their anxiety over complex scientific
developments like stem cell research. All of this reflects
the deeper – perhaps unconscious – and totally legitimate
insight that the small town is anachronistic for the modern
world. Herein is the source of the oft-noted “rage” and
“resentment” that these groups direct toward “liberals” and
“socialists.”
They appear as the cause of their distress, and this
mistaken perception leads to contradictions in which the
poorest counties of a state like Kansas will vote
Republican, citing religion and the like, even though
Republican policies are doing nothing for them and,
actually, are keeping them poor. But simply citing the
irrationality of such beliefs, even while understandably
calling for a new economic populism, misses the point.
Privileging “reason” or utility in dealing with social
problems is itself a function of modernity. This part of the
citizenry may be voting against their material interests,
but not their existential ones. Thus, when the question
arises “What’s the Matter with Kansas?”
The answer is: nothing at all.
Political finesse does not ultimately help in dealing
with this paradox. Something serious is at stake that
becomes even more serious in periods of crisis when
religious or mythical and traditional or reactionary appeals
generally assume heightened importance for precisely these
groups. To be sure: in America during the 1930s, when they
were offered something in terms of legislation that would
manifestly better their lives, the faithful and the
rural poor briefly aligned with the labor movement and urban
immigrants.
The great divide was also bridged at other moments in
American history. It is only necessary to consider the “New
Nationalism” of Teddy Roosevelt (R-NY) or the elections of
Democrats like Woodrow Wilson, FDR, Harry Truman, and Lyndon
Johnson. More recently, of course, there were the
presidential victories of Governor Jimmy Carter (D-Ga) and
Gov. Bill Clinton (D-Ark.).
But it is important to remember that these electoral
successes were built upon maintaining a racist political
structure in the South and, with perhaps making an exception
of FDR, essentially employing a rank nationalism that
brooked no opposition in the realm of foreign policy. Once
President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1964 and
mass opposition to the Vietnam War began, which resulted in
a “trauma” born of nothing more than the desire to render
foreign policy decisions accountable to the citizenry, the
“solid” South dutifully moved from the Democratic into the
Republican column. It only returned when Jimmy Carter began
the retreat from the achievements of 1968 and Bill Clinton,
after running a smart campaign against George Bush the Elder
in 1992, introduced his strategy of “triangulation” and
welfare reform.
Such compromises, however, are no longer acceptable. Or,
better, it is now the task of progressives to block the
Democratic Party from entering into compromises that would
sacrifice the interests of their base – people of color,
women, unions and the poor – in order for careerists and
party professionals “to get elected.” Many, of course, see
things differently. Mainstream Democrats, who so heavily
contributed to the ethical collapse of their party during
the onset of the Iraqi War, are now already demanding that
it shift even further toward the “center” in 2008. Given
that the “center” has gradually inched ever further to the
right since the 1990s, however, such a strategy can only
intensify the identity crisis of the Democratic Party. It
can only further diminish its appeal for traditional
constituencies, and enable the Republican Party to fashion
an even more reactionary politics. Such a strategy of
“appeasement” will surely legitimate the anti-democratic and
know nothing elements of the new provincialism.
That doesn’t seem to be a problem for the noted columnist
of The New York Times, Nicholas Kristoff, who – in the wake
of defeat – has called upon the Democratic Party to temper
its support for abortion and gay rights and its battles for
gun control and against symbols like the Confederate flag.
But why stop there? Perhaps Northern liberals can even be
induced to buy pick-up trucks, hang their guns and flags
inside, and then drive those always-willing people of color
and poor women to the voting booths where they can cast
their ballots for the always-deserving Democratic Party. But
Kristoff is not alone. Another of the “great compromisers,”
changing somewhat a phrase from Nietzsche, has an even
better idea. Steven Waldman, editor in chief of
Beliefnet.com, insists that Democrats should now
empathize more deeply with how “Christians” – unlike the
working poor or gay people or people of color let alone
Arab-Americans – feel “misunderstood and persecuted.” It
doesn’t seem to matter that not all “Christians,” but rather
the religious zealots – the missionary advocates of the new
provincialism – are the ones who feel themselves alienated
from the Democratic Party. Perhaps those degenerate
secularists on the coasts should start building a new
coalition with them by insisting upon re-opening the Scopes
Monkey Trial.
Chipping away at the right-wing allegiances of pre-modern
sectors in American society is possible, even necessary, but
“winning them over” through talk of a “new nationalism” or a
“liberal nationalism” contemptuous of multiculturalism and
the achievements of the social movements is an illusion.
Obviously points of common interest and even solidarity can
bind the most divergent groups: perhaps progressives should
support “faith-based initiatives” when it comes to the
homeless, AIDS victims, and even prisoners so long as it
doesn’t involve privileging a reactionary alternative to
left-wing forms of community organizing. But it is equally
obvious that conservatives can find reactionary
ideological points of unity and fashion deep and
sustainable alliances with reactionary constituencies more
easily than progressives. And conservatives need not qualify
their support.
Dealing with pre-modern groups and
classes, which the media likes to define simply as
“religious and rural” or “middle class” voters, is –
again – not simply a matter of political finesse.
Snapping military salutes, wearing goose hunting gear, and
loudly identifying with religious values – as Senator Kerry
did – won’t do the trick. It evidences only condescension
for small town voters with strong religious and traditional
values. They sense it, too. That is an important reason why
the Republicans were successful this past election in
identifying “religion” with evangelical fundamentalists and
the most reactionary elements of the religious community. As
for the pragmatists and compromisers in the Democratic
Party, those who hold so little sympathy for ideological
conviction, the suspicion will always exist among those “red
state” voters that they are panderers and hypocrites.
Despite the crowing by fundamentalist groups like
Focus on the Family or The Christian Defense
Coalition, however, they do not represent the religious
community of America. African-Americans and Hispanics are
both deeply religious constituencies: 89% of the former and
53% of the latter voted for the Democratic Party in 2004.
Then there are the Quaker organizations like the American
Friends Service Committee, radical groups within the
Catholic Church, and other religious institutions were all
once committed to building on the legacy of Martin Luther
King, Jr. Most remain committed to fostering progressive
domestic legislation and a humane foreign policy. Rather
than speak about compromising with religious fanatics, or
adherents of the new provincialism, it would be much more
practical and principled for secular progressives to
highlight their connections with the progressive elements of
the religious community.
The purpose of parties is perhaps “to get elected,” but
getting elected – especially over the long haul -- often
depends upon the party acting as a vehicle for “protest.”
That is the situation today. Economic divisions in the
United States will become worse, a spiteful culture of
intolerance will further harm the democratic discourse, and
the domestic “war on terror” has no end in sight. The rush
to the center, which will be presented as benefiting “us”
not simply the party regulars, is precisely what will lead
to papering over the gravity of these developments. It is
what progressives must resist. Reinvigorating the Democratic
Party is possible only by reinvigorating its base. Or, to
put it another way, providing core constituencies with
proposals and ideals that working people, women,
minorities, progressive religious institutions, the poor,
and the young can be enthusiastic about.
President
Bush and his followers promulgated an ideology concerned not
merely with fostering imperialist ambitions but with rolling
back the policies and values associated with the most humane
traditions of economic, political, and social reform. And
ideology, as Max Weber reminds us, is not like a taxi that
can be stopped at will. Can the Republicans veer even
further to the right? Is that possible? It is if we on the
left let the obsession with “security” justify the
constriction of civil liberties and a centralization of
intelligence and police agencies. It is if we let an
arbitrarily defined “axis of evil” and the current contempt
for international law go unquestioned. It is if we forget
about the lying and the distortion of democracy that have
shaped the American landscape. It is if we accept the
right-wing identification of religion with fundamentalist
zealotry. It is if we don’t link the war abroad with class
war at home. It is if we let a momentary mandate appear as a
fundamental consensus. A new authoritarian populism is
possible, in short, if progressives don’t stand up to defend
the values that have informed our best traditions: economic
justice, political liberty, and cosmopolitanism.
Notes
Frances Fox Piven, The War at Home: The
Domestic Costs of Bush’s Militarism (New York: New
Press, 2004).
Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Selected Works 3 volumes (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1969) 1:394ff.
Note the fine study by Thomas Frank, What’s
the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the
Heart of America (New York: Metropolitan Books,
2004).
Stephen Eric Bronner is
the senior editor of Logos and the author, most
recently, of
A Rumor about the Jews: Anti-Semitism, Conspiracy, and the
Protocols of Zion’ (Oxford University Press) and
Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical
Engagement (Columbia University Press). He is
Professor (II) of Political Science and a member of the
Graduate Faculties of Comparative Literature and German
Studies at Rutgers University.
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