eace talks
between India and Pakistan tend to collapse in spectacular
failure. Every attempt at peace during the last 15 years
deteriorated within months into explosive military crises
over Kashmir – in 1990, 1999, and 2002. India and Pakistan
are again attempting peace, and have been doing so since May
2003 with a minimum of violence and mutual recrimination.
Does this signal a break from the past? Is the “world’s most
dangerous conflict”, as President Bill Clinton once called
it, moving towards a final resolution? Supporters of peace
everywhere jump to answer in the affirmative, and they may
be right. But solutions to conflicts like Kashmir, Chechnya,
Sri Lanka, or Palestine do not happen quickly. Understanding
the complexity and volatility of the Kashmir problem demands
a heavy dose of realism, as a lasting agreement will require
hard decisions and tough bargaining. Yet analysts on both
sides fail to look critically enough at the problem, basing
their arguments on wrong assumptions. It would be a shame if
yet another Indo-Pakistani peace process fell victim to
unrealistic expectations.
The stated
claims of Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri leaders remain
irreconcilable, though they appear more flexible these days.
Indian politicians maintain that Kashmir is an integral part
of their country, and that Islamic Pakistan’s religion-based
claim to the Muslim-majority region is illegitimate. They
believe that Kashmir willingly joined India in 1947, but
that Pakistan invaded to thwart this development, taking and
holding one third of the state in the first war over Kashmir
in 1948. Two more wars followed in 1965 and 1999, yet the
1948 ceasefire line remains the de-facto boundary between
Indian and Pakistani Kashmir. India asserts that allowing
Kashmir to become independent or join Pakistan would
threaten the unity of the country. Pakistani leaders, on the
other hand, believe that without Kashmir their country can
be neither complete nor secure. They argue that, according
to the rules governing the partition of British India in
1947, the predominantly Muslim region of Kashmir should have
gone to Islamic Pakistan. When separatist Kashmiri militants
took up arms against the Indian state in the midst of a
massive popular uprising in 1989, Pakistan argued that human
rights abuses by security forces made Indian rule in Kashmir
illegitimate.
One of the
reasons the Kashmir conflict seems so intractable is that
the issue has so many difficult dimensions, yet no one
person can hope to fully understand – much less control –
them all. If any one falls out of sync, the entire process
could collapse like a house of cards. The conflict’s first
dimension is Kashmiri politics in which the pervasive
sentiment of azadi (freedom) confronts the
overwhelming might of the Indian state. The explosion of
violent rebellion that catapulted Kashmir into the
international spotlight in 1989 proved that the famously
disputed territory is more than just a piece of real estate
to be fought over by outside powers. A second aspect is the
57-year-old confrontation between the Indian and Pakistani
strategic establishments over who should control Kashmir.
This unceasing, low-level war overshadows almost every
aspect of relations between the two countries, and threatens
to destabilize the region. The third is public opinion in
India and Pakistan where Kashmir is an extremely emotive
issue. Any government hoping to negotiate in good faith will
have a hard time convincing its people to go along. Lastly,
the much talked about and often exaggerated American role.
Kashmiris
caught in the middle
Indian
analysts give the impression that the “silent majority”
of Kashmiris are tired of violence and are ready to give up
their secessionist struggle. It is only a violent and vocal
minority that is really anti-India. Kashmiris want to
participate in national elections and join the Indian
mainstream, so the story goes, but are afraid of Pakistani
terrorists who threaten them with violence. Pakistanis, on
the other hand, assume that Kashmiris will never accept
anything short of secession (and accession to Pakistan), and
will forever support the glorious “freedom fighters”
battling the Indian state. Kashmiris, goes the usual
argument, appreciate how Pakistan has trumpeted their cause
internationally and supported the militant struggle. These
wildly divergent perspectives on what Kashmiris want reflect
the opposing strategic interests of the two countries, and
have little to do with Kashmiri public opinion.
Kashmiri-speaking Muslims, who make up almost 70% of the
state’s population, appear to favor independence from both
India and Pakistan, though one can never say for sure
because no accurate opinion polls exist. This desire for
independence, which has always brewed beneath the surface,
did not gain momentum until the 1980s when street agitations
and police firings rocked the Kashmir Valley. Following an
apparently rigged election in 1987 and the deaths of
hundreds of protestors at the hands of Indian security
forces during the next few years, many Kashmiri youth became
militants, apparently convinced that democratic methods had
failed. Indians would like to believe that once the
democratic process in Kashmir is firmly reestablished and
governance improved, the people will give up their struggle
and the problem will go away. But a deep cynicism about
Indian democracy remains, even though the last two Kashmiri
elections were widely considered free and fair. The dominant
argument in the Valley is that elections remain insufficient
as long as New Delhi refuses to address the possibilities of
independence, a plebiscite to determine the will of
Kashmiris, or even administrative autonomy. Indian officials
hope that Kashmiris will tire of their struggle in the
long-run and settle for functioning democracy and Indian
citizenship. To this end, India’s leaders are willing to
wait forever because time is on their side. They have what
they want of Kashmir, the power to defend it against
Pakistan, and the ability to contain the insurgency, which
they believe will wane over time. This fact arouses
passionate consternation among Pakistani officials,
frustration among well-meaning peace activists, great
sadness among secessionist leaders, and deep apathy among
the impoverished Kashmiri farmers who want only to feed
their families and protect them from violence.
As no accurate
poll exists to ascertain the wishes of Kashmiris regarding
independence or accession to India or Pakistan, one must
rely on the views of political leaders and journalists in
touch with public sentiment. Interviews with top separatist
leaders and editors of major newspapers in the Kashmir
Valley indicate that support for independence remains
strong, suspicion of India high, and distrust of Pakistan
less but growing. The Indian government is disliked for its
heavy-handed policies and abrogation of its many agreements
with Kashmiri leaders; Pakistan is distrusted because of the
murky role of its intelligence agencies in backing
fundamentalist, pro-Pakistan militants, and helping destroy
the pro-independence outfits. Until about ten years ago,
many Kashmiris appreciated Pakistan’s help, but goodwill
towards Pakistan has since dried up, and Kashmiris now see
themselves sandwiched between two powerful governments
pursuing their own particular interests. Joining Pakistan
would mean “trading one slavery for another,” according to
one separatist leader. No leader opposed to independence
(whether he wants accession to Pakistan or India) can
command broad popular support; even the most pro-India
Kashmiri politicians promise azadi (freedom) at
public rallies.
While the
fundamental demand for independence remains strong, popular
support for the tactic of militancy and terrorism is
declining. Nearly all the pro-independence militants were
either dead or in jail by 1992. By the late 1990s, more
powerful pan-Islamist outfits from Pakistan, known to use
suicide bombers and target civilians, were sidelining the
only remaining Kashmiri militant outfit, the Hizbul
Mujahideen. Indian officials claim that more than 80% of
the militants are from either Pakistan or Afghanistan.
Though the accuracy of this statistic is debated, many
Kashmiri journalists, separatists, and former insurgents
have said that foreign militants now outnumber their more
popular but less deadly Kashmiri counterparts. Referred to
in the valley as “mehamaan mujahideen” (guest
freedom fighters), these new militants are seen as outsiders
under the influence of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies,
whose goal is not independence for Kashmiris but merger of
the state with Pakistan. The killing of moderate separatist
leaders such as Abdul Ghani Lone in 2002 and the uncle of
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq in 2004 has also dealt a blow to the
militant cause. So has the killing of many innocent
Kashmiris in grenade attacks and bombings.
An April 2002
poll by MORI, an independent British polling agency, found
that out of 850 Kashmiris interviewed, 65% believed that
foreign militants are damaging the Kashmir cause, while most
of the rest said they are neither damaging nor helpful. Two
thirds of respondents said Pakistan’s involvement in the
region during the last decade has been bad, reflecting the
view that Pakistan’s generals hijacked the militant cause,
turning it to serve their own strategic interests. By spring
2004, every major separatist leader except one had distanced
themselves from militancy – the exception being the
pro-Pakistan hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who has a
troubled relationship with his party, the Jamaat-i-Islami
of Kashmir, whose leadership wants to distance itself from
the militant struggle. Most top secessionist leaders are
pro-dialogue support the peace process. The separatists’
shift away from violent methods was striking, as nearly
every secessionist outfit supported the armed struggle
during the 1990s: the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF) was a militant organization until
1992, while the Jamaat-i-Islami, People’s Conference,
and Awami Action Committee had militant wings.
There was much
hope for peace during this time as politics in the Valley
appeared to be undergoing a structural shift towards
peaceful methods of protest. But by June 2004, the tide
turned with renewed militant attacks on moderate,
pro-dialogue separatist leaders, and lukewarm commitment to
dialogue by India’s newly elected government in New Delhi.
As a result the hardliners re-emerged. Syed Ali Geelani
regained control over the powerful Jamaat-i-Islami,
and reappeared in the headlines opposing dialogue and
voicing cynicism about the peace process in the midst of a
new wave of political violence, including attacks on
pro-dialogue separatist leaders. Many analysts say this is
only a temporary setback, but there is no way to know until
the snows melt in the spring and the passes through the
mountains are cleared.
The influx of
pan-Islamist militants from Pakistan – many of whom either
have links with Al Qaeda or share its
ideological predilections – has contributed to declining
international support for the separatist cause. After 2001,
the US State Department in its annual Patterns of
Global Terrorism report designated the two
major pan-Islamist outfits, the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba
and Jaish-e-Mohammad, foreign terrorist
organizations subject to a wide range of sanctions, and put
the Kashmiri Hizbul Mujahideen on a lesser watch list
of “other terrorist groups”. The radically changed global
environment following the terrorist attacks of September
2001 convinced moderate separatist leaders that they should
distance themselves from militancy for fear of being
associated with terrorism and losing international support
altogether. According to Bilal Lone, a member of the
Hurriyat Conference, an umbrella organization of top
separatist leaders, September 11th changed
everything. “Kashmir is part of the world and must change
with the world,” according to Lone. “We have recognized that
where there is jihad, there will be no international
support. Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs will have to live
together side by side.” This sentiment remains among a
mostly divided and despondent separatist leadership despite
the recent escalation in militancy.
Strategic
Myths
For 15 years,
Pakistani strategists have based their Kashmir policy on the
assumption that they can wrest the disputed region from
India through a combination of force, support to militants,
and international pressure. There is a pervasive belief in
Pakistan’s strategic establishment that the Indians are weak
and cowardly, that they will eventually buckle under the
strain of a popular insurgency and international criticism
of the human rights abuses that have accompanied the
suppression of this rebellion. Pakistani strategists talk
passionately about Kashmir and the plight of Kashmiris, and
many believe its possession by India is an unacceptable
threat to their security. Indians, on the other hand,
believe that Pakistan is a rogue state with rogue
intelligence agencies obsessed with spreading terrorism and
Islamic fundamentalism. Indian strategists assume that the
world will eventually see this, at which time the
international community will come around to India’s point of
view and force Pakistan to back off. Indian policy-makers
also assume that their terrorism problem is entirely the
result of Pakistani involvement. They believe, therefore,
that once the major powers force Pakistan to cut its links
with the militants, then Kashmiris will give up on secession
and participate in national elections. The problem will then
simply go away.
Rather than
buckle as Pakistani strategists hoped, India has not budged
an inch since the Kashmir Valley exploded into violence in
1989. Rather than run like cowards, India responded with
overwhelming force when Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry
secretly took strategic peaks on the Indian side in 1999.
Indian strategists now believe they have a better hold than
ever over the insurgency, and enjoy greater international
support in their efforts to eliminate the most dangerous
militant outfits. The heavy international criticism of
alleged human rights abuses by Indian security forces that
was so prevalent during the 1990s has dropped off. According
to Yasin Malik, a separatist leader and former militant
commander, organizations such as Amnesty International that
pledged support to the separatist cause during the early and
mid 1990s have all but disappeared from the scene since
2001.
While
Pakistan’s renewed relations with the US helped it emerge
from the prolonged financial crisis and international
isolation into which it had sunk by the late 1990s,
strategic relations between the US and India have also
improved, including unprecedented cooperation on
counter-terrorism. In the meantime, India’s economy, which
is already six times larger than Pakistan’s, is surging
ahead, helping to finance an ambitious defense modernization
plan. Pakistan’s economy, on the other hand, is stagnating,
despite an enormous infusion of capital from the US, much of
which has gone either to the military or the country’s small
elite. Pakistan is also facing pressure from the
International Monetary Fund to cut defense spending. These
and other developments have given Indian strategists new
confidence. Indian policy-makers feel stronger than ever,
determined to hold their ground and speak from a position of
strength.
On the other
hand, India’s assumptions that the international community
will eventually notice Pakistan’s connection to Islamic
militancy may be correct, but whether the major powers would
force Pakistan to back off is another matter. Indian hopes
that the US would declare Pakistan a rogue state were dashed
soon after September 11th, 2001 when it became
clear that Pakistan would become a major US ally against Al
Qaeda and the Taliban. As long as the violence in Kashmir
does not adversely affect the western powers, Pakistan’s
role will be overlooked. The attack on America’s World Trade
Center towers forced Pakistan to distance itself from
Islamic militants for fear of becoming a target of America’s
new “war on terrorism”. If the Pakistan army makes what
appears to be a sincere about face on Kashmiri militancy,
they could steal India’s thunder, and the international
community would have little reason to weigh in on India’s
side. President Musharraf pledged to disarm the terrorist
organizations operating on Pakistani soil, and reform the
Pakistani political system. Washington’s policy-makers
support Musharraf, and believe that he is the man most
needed to track down Al Qaeda militants on Pakistani soil
and prevent instability in Afghanistan.
It also
remains to be seen whether the problem in Kashmir would
really go away once the Pakistan connection is severed.
While there appear to be more foreign than Kashmiri
militants, Kashmiris continue to carry out regular attacks
against security forces, and many remain quite popular
despite dampened public enthusiasm for violent methods. In
2001, the last year for which data is available, more than
40% of militants killed by security forces were local
Kashmiris. Though the separatist politicians have, for the
most part, cut their links with the militants, they do not
criticize them; to do so would “dishonor the blood of the
martyrs”, according to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a well-regarded
separatist leader. What he means is that because so many
Kashmiris have died in the struggle, the cause must not be
abandoned. Average Kashmiris may be tired of violence and
cynical about their leaders, but that does not mean that
they have given up their desire to be free. Furthermore, a
drop-off in militancy would not necessarily bring a return
to “normalcy” without a serious peace agreement between
Pakistan, India, and Kashmiri separatist leaders because the
separatist politicians may very well renew the street
protests and boycotts of the 1980s, leading to the usual
over-reaction by Indian security forces.
Misunderstanding public opinion
One hears
people on all sides – whether in India, Pakistan, Kashmir,
or western capitals – say that ordinary people want peace.
It is only the governments that get in the way. Pakistanis
believe that Indian politicians profess peace, but only for
political mileage, and always go back on their commitments.
Pakistan’s leaders believe that Indians are anti-Muslim,
that they will never accept Pakistan (created as a homeland
for South Asia’s Muslims) as a legitimate political entity,
and that they seek the break up of Pakistan. Most Indians
believe that Pakistan’s generals are committed only to
making war, and will never stop until they have taken all of
Kashmir and weakened India in the process.
Reading the
Indian press and talking to leaders as well as ordinary
people, one gets the impression that Indians, for the most
part, do indeed want peace. To the surprise of many
Pakistanis, India’s Hindu nationalist government showed a
remarkable commitment to peace that was lacking in previous
administrations. As the peace process gained momentum
through the first half of 2004, there was very little
criticism from either the Indian press or the political
opposition. However, Indian leaders have yet to take
significant risks – that is, to talk about Kashmir and offer
solid concessions. If the Indian leadership moves beyond
mere rhetoric and commits itself to offering Pakistan enough
territorial concessions to allow it a peace with honor,
would the Indian public go along? The US-based Kashmir study
group has suggested that the Muslim majority areas of
Kashmir become independent and the Hindu and Buddhist
portions be ceded permanently to India. But the Indian
public has never warmed to this possibility. Could a weak
coalition government follow through on it in the teeth of
popular opposition? Because of India’s status-quo position
on Kashmir, it is easy for Indians to seek peace with
Pakistan and appear reasonable and rational, as long as they
do not have to give away land. “Why can’t we just let
bygones by bygones,” Indian diplomats ask. “Let’s forget the
past. You keep your part of Kashmir, and we keep ours.”
India’s only offer is – and likely will be for the
indefinite future – to turn the Line of Control separating
Indian and Pakistani portions of Kashmir into a permanent
international boundary.
Public opinion
in Pakistan is more complex, and varies from region to
region. In the outlying provinces of Baluchistan, Sindh, and
even the North West Frontier Province, Kashmir is not a high
priority, and the people are willing to accept whatever the
government decides. In the core province of Punjab, however,
Kashmir is a hugely emotive issue, made all the more so by
decades of government propaganda and the fact that more than
80% of the army hails from this region. Public opinion in
Punjab is mostly opposed to any settlement that involves
backing down on Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir, or cutting
support to the “freedom fighters” battling the Indian state.
What liberal Indian commentators often refer to as
Pakistan’s “peace constituency” of “civil society groups” is
exaggerated, limited as it is to a small and isolated circle
of English-speaking elites with little interest in grass
roots sentiment or much influence over official policy.
Many prominent
Pakistani politicians and press persons are critical of the
peace process because they believe President Musharraf is
offering too many concessions (probably under US pressure)
without getting enough in return. The hawks on Pakistan’s
powerful political right are increasingly influential and
appear to be more in touch with grass roots public opinion
on foreign policy matters. The fastest growing and now
largest-circulated daily in Pakistan is the Urdu-language
Nawa-e-Vaqt, a stridently right wing paper known for its
hawkish positions on foreign policy, sympathy for Islamist
causes, and its stridently nationalist yet libertarian
positions on other domestic issues. For example, the paper
supports the Taliban, opposes the peace process with India,
and is deeply critical of Pakistan’s renewed relations with
the United States. When the Nawa-e-Vaqt refused to
compromise on its opposition to peace with India, the
military government pulled all official advertisements,
which make up a substantial portion of the paper’s revenue.
Musharraf has
faced stinging criticism for his abrupt turn-arounds on the
Taliban, nuclear weapons, and support to the jihad in
Kashmir. Yet many Pakistanis still believe in the ideologies
that justified the old policies, and think the president has
betrayed what were almost sacred causes until a few years
ago. Making peace with India over Kashmir will require
Musharraf to back down on what is, arguably, the country’s
most sacred foreign policy issue. Salim Bokhari, editor of
The News, a major Pakistani English-language daily,
told the author: “It is in the blood of every Pakistani that
Kashmir be a part of Pakistan, but India will not give it up
on a silver platter. We will have to take it. This is what
the Pakistani people were told for years. You can’t just
turn this around over night.” Musharraf is facing a rising
tide of public criticism for betraying the very same ideas
that the army taught people to believe in for decades. If
opposition to Musharraf’s policies grows, the peace process
could collapse, as taking a strident line on Kashmir may be
the quickest way for Musharraf to shore up support among the
country’s powerful and vocal political right. The Islamists
and anti-peace Kashmir hawks will continue to be strong as
long as the military keeps the mainstream parties divided
and their leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, in
exile. As things stand now, the most vocal and articulate
advocates for democracy and an end to military rule are
leaders on the religious right such as Qazi Hussein Ahmed of
the Jamaat-i-Islami and Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami.
Inflated
hopes about America’s role
After the
attack on America’s World Trade Center towers in September
2001, Indian strategists assumed that the US would finally
pay attention to Pakistan’s connection to the jihadis and
declare the country a state sponsor of terrorism. They hoped
that Washington would recognize that India and the US share
the common threats of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism,
both of which emanate from Pakistan, and have been supported
for years by the country’s security establishment. Indian
strategists, therefore, concentrated on exposing the
Pakistan connection, and refused to talk about Kashmir until
“cross-border terrorism” ended. Pakistani strategists, on
the other hand, assumed that their renewed importance to the
United States after its attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan
would ensure that American policy-makers would turn a blind
eye to Pakistan’s support for militants in Kashmir.
Pakistani policy-makers assumed they could escalate the
level of militant violence, and rely on the US to prevent
India from attacking in retaliation.
The US favored
neither country, disrupting calculations on both sides.
American policy-makers recognize that if they become too
involved, they could ruin the entire process. Critics on
both sides are wary of US involvement, and could easily
discredit any agreement seen as the result of US pressure.
This is a particular danger in Pakistan where the public is
extremely angry about the inordinate influence Washington
has over the country’s foreign and domestic security
policies. America’s official role in Kashmir has remained
limited to encouraging dialogue and preventing another
flare-up that could compromise US interests in Afghanistan.
Washington policy makers seek good relations with both
countries, and will not take sides on Kashmir.
To the
surprise of Pakistanis, the US, recognizing that Islamabad’s
support to terrorist groups could cause another war with
India or further destabilize the Pakistani state, pressured
Musharraf to put a stop to the infiltration of militants
into Indian Kashmir. The Pakistan military reluctantly
complied, though it has made little effort to close down the
jihadi network. American leaders disappointed India as well.
They did not even suggest that Pakistan was a state sponsor
of terrorism; to do so would have made ridiculous the claim
that Musharraf was a frontline ally in the “war on
terrorism”. As long as Pakistan cooperates with the US and
attempts to shut down the jihadi groups operating on its
soil, there is no reason to isolate its leadership, whatever
may have been its past transgressions. It was naïve for
India to believe the US would expend valuable political
capital to shut down militant outfits that are not involved
in attacks against western interests. The US played down
Pakistan’s support to militancy, working in private to
ensure a reduction in infiltration without appearing to take
sides. American policy-makers did not originally agree with
the Indian view that Kashmir is a terrorism problem, or that
it should be considered part of the war on terrorism.
Rather, they concerned themselves with ensuring Pakistan’s
stability and gaining the support of its leadership.
This attitude
has changed slowly during the years since September 11th.
More awareness about the situation in South Asia has led
more US officials to note the connection between the jihadi
movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Islamist
extremists fighting in Kashmir. While the US remains
sensitive to the independence movement in the Valley, many
American officials are also talking about the possibility
that many, if not most, of the militants fighting in Kashmir
are from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Realizing this fact does
not mean that the US will expend political capital to
address the problem, however. US officials are concerned
most of all with not rocking the boat in Pakistan in a way
that might cause problems for Musharraf’s government or
compromise US-Pakistan relations. American policy-makers
want to ensure that tensions over Kashmir diminish, but
their greater concern is the stability of Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
New
Complications
India’s Prime
Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, was ousted from power last
May, and replaced by a new government whose policies on
Pakistan and Kashmir remain unclear. Despite its hawkish
proclivities and Hindu nationalist ideology, Vajpayee’s
government showed unprecedented creativity and flexibility
in its dealings with Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists.
Vajpayee was the first prime minister to visit the Valley
since troubles began in 1989, and he did so at great risk to
his life. Will India’s new Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan
Singh, follow through on his predecessor’s political
program? Since he came to power, relations between the
center and the separatists have deteriorated; militant
attacks on moderate separatist leaders have increased; the
moderate, pro-dialogue Maulvi Abbas Ansari has stepped down
as leader of the separatist Hurriyat coalition; and the
hard-line, pro-Pakistan leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani has
reemerged as the uniting factor in the Hurriyat, thereby
strengthening the hardliners in the separatist camp. Singh
demonstrated his government’s commitment to solving the
conflict, however, by visiting the Valley in November. It
will be difficult for him to make a deal with Pakistan,
however, until he consolidates his party’s grip on power.
In the
meantime, Pakistan is engulfed in an intense civil-military
struggle over the future structure of the Pakistani state.
General Pervez Musharraf, who is both president and army
chief, is attempting to carve out a permanent role for the
military in Pakistani politics. Musharraf recently decided
to continue military rule for another five years,
backtracking on his promises to bring democracy back by the
end of 2004. He is under heavy criticism for compromising
with India over Kashmir, sending the army into the tribal
areas to capture alleged militants, and for his close
cooperation with the US. Pakistan’s political opposition is
growing in strength, recovering after more than three years
of army rule, and tapping into a growing tide of
anti-military sentiment. The Islamists are emerging as key
opposition figures and are growing in strength, while
moderate leaders remain in jail or exile. The Islamists are
the most bitter critics of Musharraf’s peace process with
India, and the most vocal opponents of military rule. Will
Musharraf be more likely to make a lasting peace than an
elected leader? Can he afford to negotiate with India, and
survive both popular opposition and the ire of the
Islamists? Will India give him enough concessions to allow
him a peace with honor? All these unanswered questions make
for a shaky peace process.
Gerald Meyerle is a
Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics, University of
Virginia. His e-mail address is
gmm5f@virginia.edu.
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