The lunch
provided for participants at an ethics conference includes
no vegetarian entrée—even though you specified in accepting
the invitation that you would need one. You ask the head of
the catering team what vegetarians are supposed to eat. He
says, “Oh, no problem. There’s a salad”—as if those who try
to eat cruelty-free are not entitled to a main course
(even at an ethics conference).
Dining with
a distinguished philosopher who has devoted much of her
career to defending “human dignity,” you discover that she
has never morally questioned meat eating; indeed, she has
never thought carefully about the moral status of animals at
all. Surely, you think, extensive training in critical
thinking entails some obligation to examine one’s own
complicity in harmful practices.
You go to
the house of friends, neighbors, or relatives for dinner.
Knowing you don’t eat most meat and apparently feeling
defensive—even though you have not brought up the issue—they
try to put you on the defensive by demanding an
explanation for your willingness to eat shrimp or to play
catch with a leather football. What is the point here?
That 100% compliance with whatever standards you hold is
more important than having morally defensible standards? Or
that less than complete success in your effort to live
morally gives everyone else implicit permission to ignore
completely the moral concern at issue?
A colleague
sits next to you at a faculty meeting and says, “Oh, I
brought a chicken sandwich. I hope you won’t be offended.”
While you appreciate his sensitivity to your feelings, it
seems pretty clear that your interests should not be
the focus of moral attention here.
The last
frontier of bigotry will be hard to cross.
But what is
the last frontier? Part of the difficulty is that it is
hard to articulate. We can call it “speciesism” or “species
bigotry” and characterize it as an unwillingness to give
some individuals their due simply because they are not
members of our species (or of some group assumed to include
only humans such as autonomous beings). But what are
nonhuman animals due, exactly? And, since it isn’t so
obvious what they are due, how can we even advance a charge
of species bigotry? If reasonable people can disagree about
what animals are due, why shouldn’t we be pro-choice about
decisions affecting them?
Let’s back
up a minute.
Morally
serious people disagree about what justice requires in
connection with affirmative action, but that hardly prevents
us from knowing that slavery, lynching, and Jim Crow in the
American south were viciously racist. Thoughtful, decent
people differ about the reasons for the dearth of women in
university physics departments. But that doesn’t obscure
the fact that it’s sexist to discourage women across the
board from seeking careers outside the house. Meanwhile,
differences about whether respect for gays and lesbians
demands full legal recognition of gay marriage hardly
invites doubts about whether homophobic physical assault is
morally repugnant.
In the same
way, uncertainty about what animals are due doesn’t prevent
us from recognizing clear cases of species bigotry such as
factory farming, cosmetics testing on animals, the fur
industry, whaling, abuse of circus animals, rodeos,
bullfights, and complacent acceptance of such practices and
institutions.
“Wait, how
can you say that?” someone might object. “All morally
serious people agree that racial minorities, women, and
homosexuals deserve no less consideration than whites, men,
and straight people—that they have equal moral status or
standing—even if some details of appropriate policies and
treatment are debatable. But, as you yourself have
acknowledged, with animals it’s not even clear that they’re
entitled to any such principle of equality.
Nor are matters much clearer if we note that only
sentient animals, possessed of feelings, can be
benefited or harmed in ways they care about—meaning they
have a welfare and interests, the commonsense foundation of
moral status. For, as you have noted, even with sentient
animals there is honest disagreement about whether they
deserve equal consideration or (as suggested by some of our
considered judgments about pest control, indigenous peoples’
hunting rights, and several other issues) substantial but
less than fully equal consideration. If we’re not even sure
what animals deserve at this fundamental level, how can we
know what counts as giving animals less than they’re due?”
In response
to this objection, I will advance two claims. First, much
human use of sentient animals (hereafter “animals” for
brevity) is inconsistent with any serious regard for
them and so is clearly beyond the moral pale. Much animal
use causes them extensive suffering either for frivolous
purposes (e.g., amusement, vanity) or for more substantial
purposes (e.g., nutrition, warmth) but where non-animal
alternatives are readily available. Second, a lot of the
contemporary discussion of animal rights obscures this
important point, impeding moral progress.
In advancing
the first claim, I will focus on meat eating. More
specifically, I will consider (a) factory farming, the
institution that probably causes more harm to animals than
any other today, and (b) the purchasing and consumption of
its products, the practice that keeps factory farming in
business. I will sketch an argument that factory farming
and consumers’ routine support for it are indefensible.
If there is
one moral principle that is beyond serious doubt, it is the
principle of nonmaleficence. This principle states
that, other things equal, we should not harm others; put
another way, we should not harm them unnecessarily. A
system of thought that did not embrace nonmaleficence would
hardly be recognizable as a moral system. Let’s
assume, then, that we accept the principle that it is wrong
to cause others unnecessary harm. Or, since one might argue
that very slight unnecessary harm to others, or even greater
unnecessary harms to which others consent, aren’t so clearly
wrong, let us specify the principle so as to make it
breathtakingly obvious: “It is wrong to cause extensive
unnecessary harm to others without their consent.”
Presumably, anyone who is neither a nihilist nor a
psychopath accepts this principle. Now….
“I see where
you’re going with this,” one might interrupt. “You’ll say
animals are among ‘others’ and then apply the principle to
animals. But that may be cheating. Our moral tradition has
always favored human interests over animal interests, so
maybe this principle, however sensible it sounds, shouldn’t
be extended to animals.”
My
interlocutor is right that our moral tradition has always
favored human interests. Many people today challenge this
favoritism, or at least certain aspects of it such as
unequal consideration at a fundamental level. But whether
such favoritism is defensible is not an issue we need settle
here. That is because everyone involved in this debate over
animal ethics agrees that paradigm instances of cruelty to
animals are wrong. How to explain this considered judgment,
and how to conceptualize animals’ moral status in light of
it, are matters of disagreement; but that paradigm instances
of cruelty to animals (e.g., smashing them to death for fun)
is wrong is a judgment that all serious discussants affirm.
And it takes little further reflection to see that the most
plausible way to ground this judgment is by acknowledging
that our obligations of nonmaleficence extend to animals
(sentient animals, who can be harmed in ways that matter to
them). For while the moral judgment that condemns cruelty
to animals is confident and unwavering, efforts to explain
this judgment without allowing that animals are due
nonmaleficence are much less certain. This point merits
expansion.
Some,
following Kant, have argued that we should not be cruel to
animals because such cruelty is likely to spill over into
brutish treatment of our fellow humans. Others have claimed
that the only thing wrong with such cruelty is that it
upsets the sensibilities of animal lovers. But such
human-centered accounts always seem empirically questionable
or at least to admit of exceptions—though the moral
condemnation of cruelty does not. More importantly, these
accounts miss the most obvious reason cruelty is wrong: the
great harm it causes to its victims for no compelling
reason. The only ones who are clearly and in every case
wronged by cruelty are its victims. Set up a case, as
contrived as you like, that can guarantee that cruelty to
some animal would have no negative effect on humans, and
still the action—say, kicking around a nonthreatening
dog—will seem obviously wrong. The only satisfactory
account of the wrongness of cruelty acknowledges the moral
status of its victims. Animals have moral status in this
sense: Their interests have (at least some) moral importance
independently of how our treatment of animals affects
humans. Thus the scope of nonmaleficence includes animals.
We return,
then, to our principle: “It is wrong to cause extensive
unnecessary harm to others without their consent.” Factory
farms do precisely this. Obviously, cattle, pigs, chickens,
and turkeys do not consent to the harms inflicted on them.
And, as anyone familiar with the conditions of factory farms
knows, they cause very extensive harm to animals confined in
them.
Consider the
lives of factory-farmed hens (and their brothers) in the
United States. Where chicks are raised to produce eggs,
male chicks, lacking commercial value, are commonly gassed,
ground up alive, or suffocated. The females live their
lives in crowded, highly unnatural, uncomfortable settings.
Many are subjected to forced molting, in which water is
withheld for one to three days and food for up to two weeks
in order to extend their productive lives. When considered
spent, they are stuffed into crates and transported by
truck, sometimes for days, without food, water, or
protection from the elements. At a slaughterhouse, hens are
shackled upside down on a conveyor belt until an automated
knife cuts their throats. They are fully conscious during
this process because the Humane Slaughter Act does not apply
to poultry—despite the fact that, at more than 6 billion per
year, they represent the animals most commonly slaughtered
for food in this country. Clearly hens raised in factory
farms undergo extensive harm during their lifetimes. Any
detailed account of these lives suggests that they are not
worth living; better, from the standpoint of their
interests, not to have been brought into existence at all.
The same may be said for broiler chickens, hogs, veal
calves, and arguably cattle raised specifically for beef
(whose six months of roaming outdoors, I would argue, do not
compensate for the harms they experience during that time
and especially afterward).
With this
sketch of factory farms in view, one might wonder whether
farm animals raised in more natural, less intensive
conditions can have lives worth living. In this essay I
focus on the institution that apparently causes the greatest
overall harm to animals while producing most of the meat,
eggs, and dairy products consumed in the United States. I
have discussed family farms elsewhere.
For now, in passing, I urge readers not to overlook harmful
practices that characterize even this more benign form of
animal husbandry—including unanesthetized branding,
dehorning, and castration; the separation of mothers from
their young; and rough, sometimes brutal, treatment in
transport, handling, and slaughter.
Returning to
factory farms, they clearly cause extensive harm to
animals. Just as importantly, this harm is unnecessary
insofar as eating the products of factory farms is
unnecessary. No doubt some of the world’s people, due to
impoverished food options, need to eat meat in order to be
healthy. But this is not the situation facing, say, most
Americans. It is unlikely that anyone who will read this
essay will really need to eat meat, eggs, or dairy products
produced in factory farms. After all, readily available
alternatives are adequate for a healthful diet. Nowadays,
even such mainstream grocery chains as Giant and Safeway
carry tofu, soy milk, non-dairy cheese and margarine,
cage-free eggs, and many varieties of soy-based “veggie
meats” (burgers, imitation chicken, sandwich “meats,” etc.)
For most Americans, and similarly situated people in other
countries, a little planning should be sufficient for a
healthful diet that steers free of factory farm products.
Considering that most readers of this essay can achieve such
a diet without even changing grocery stores, it would
hardly be plausible to assert that, for these individuals,
buying and eating factory farm products is necessary.
One might counter, however, that doing so is necessary
for the specific economic purpose of keeping factory farms
in business. But this appeal is unpersuasive. For one
thing, any economic harm caused by the demise of factory
farming would have to be borne just once whereas the harms
to animals will be exacted indefinitely if factory farms
remain in business. Second, there should be a rough parity
between agribusinesses’ losses and the gains of other
businesses such as producers of soy products; as meat
consumption plummets, the consumption of alternatives rises.
Third, the risks to human well-being entailed by
factory farming—including environmental degradation, health
risks, inhumane working conditions, and highly inefficient
use of grain proteins—would be avoided or reduced
(indefinitely) if the industry is eliminated.
Finally, there are moral limits to what we may do to others
in pursuing economic interests, and causing billions of
sentient beings massive harm every year, I submit, oversteps
those bounds.
In sum, it makes sense to say that the harms of factory
farming are unnecessary. That is, they are unnecessary for
any purpose—such as human life or health—that might
plausibly be thought to justify the massive harm involved.
Indeed, the conditions of factory farming provide paradigm
instances of cruelty, which any plausible specification of
nonmaleficence must condemn.
Factory faming causes extensive, unnecessary harm to which
its victims have not consented. Since causing such harm is
wrong if anything is wrong, the conclusion that
factory farming is unjustified seems inescapable. “Hold
on,” one might object. “Even if factory farming is morally
indefensible, that doesn’t mean buying and eating its
products is wrong. After all, consumers aren’t causing any
harm.” Suppose someone said, “I’m not kicking cats to
death. I’m just paying someone else to do it.” We would
judge this person to act wrongly in encouraging and
providing financial support for cruelty. Similarly, were it
not for consumers’ continual patronage of their products,
factory farms would be unable to survive. Regardless of how
distant they may feel from the harms caused to animals by
this institution, consumers bear significant responsibility
for these harms. Although somewhat vague, the following
rule seems plausible: “Make every reasonable effort not to
provide financial support to institutions and practices that
cause extensive unnecessary harm.”
This plausible rule suggests that routine patronizing of
factory farm products is, at least for the vast majority of
this essay’s readers, morally indefensible. The rule does
not require extraordinary effort or sainthood. It does not
condemn making some exceptions to personal policies that
accord with the rule. Nor does it make it obvious what our
obligations are with respect to seafood or products from
family farms. But this rule does condemn a practice in
which most people, including most philosophers and
ethicists, engage—apparently with little or no prickling of
conscience and little or no effort to reduce their
complicity in extensive unnecessary harm.
That it’s
wrong to cause extensive unnecessary harm seems intuitively
obvious. That we should try hard not to encourage and pay
others to cause such harm seems nearly as obvious. How can
we account, then, for the violation of these norms by the
vast majority of the public, including those trained in
critical thinking and those specializing in ethics? There
are many factors we could consider: the psychology of
avoidance, denial, rationalization, and self-interested
bias; the sociology of following traditions and not
questioning what most people do; the business of promoting
benign images of industry while hiding its dark side; the
government’s role in protecting big business; the American
ideology of capitalism largely unconstrained by moral
concerns. All these factors, and others, contribute to
species bigotry. In advancing the second major thesis of
this essay, I will focus on a single factor that is commonly
overlooked even by scholars in animal ethics: the very terms
in which arguments for animal protection are commonly made.
Many animal
protectionists use the language of rights. Animals
have rights, they say, and this is why it is wrong to
exploit them. But what does it mean to say animals have
rights? Three meanings can be helpfully distinguished. In
a very broad sense, to say animals have rights is simply to
say that they have moral status, that they are not mere
tools for our use or playthings for our amusement, that
their interests have at least some moral weight
(irrespective of how promoting their interests may promote
our own). Assuming I am right in holding that no account of
the wrongness of cruelty can fail to acknowledge the moral
status of its victims, then animals clearly have rights in
this moral-status sense and their having such rights has
everything to do with the wrongness of exploiting them in
various ways.
But,
according to another usage common in ethical theory, to say
that animals have rights is to say something much stronger:
that their most important interests—such as avoiding
suffering—deserve such strong moral protections that it is
nearly always wrong to sacrifice these interests even if
doing so is necessary to maximize overall utility (where
everyone’s comparable interests, including those of animals,
receive equal consideration). This is a very controversial
claim. Indeed, it is somewhat controversial to assert, as
utilitarians deny, that human beings have rights in this
strong, utility-trumping sense.
Unfortunately, many animal advocates maintain not merely
that animals have such strong rights, but that the moral
case against factory farming and other animal-exploiting
institutions depends on their having such rights.
Meanwhile, many defenders of the status quo of animal usage
contend that it is precisely because animals do not
have such rights that the status quo is justified. Thus, in
a recent book, Tom Regan, who champions animal rights in the
utility-trumping sense, and Carl Cohen, who defends most
current animal usage, both claim that the crucial issue is
whether animals have rights in this sense.
Each claims that the other’s position is clearly
indefensible once all the relevant arguments are in.
The reader is thereby offered this impression: Either
thorough-going liberation of animals from husbandry,
biomedical research, and other animal-harming institutions
is justified or something resembling the status quo is
justified; the single crucial determinant of which of these
polar visions is correct is whether animals have
utility-trumping rights; and, since each author expresses
utter certainty that his view is correct, one of the authors
must be mad. I hope readers reject this bizarre impression
and, with it, the thesis that whether animals have
utility-trumping rights is the most important issue in
animal ethics. It is not. Moreover, by falsely
dichotomizing positions, those who advance this thesis
obscure the ethical issues about animal usage and, to that
extent, impede moral progress.
Far more
important than whether animals have utility-trumping rights
is whether they deserve equal consideration (as both
utilitarians and strong-rights theorists, in their differing
ways, contend). If animals deserve equal consideration,
then wherever humans and animals have a prudentially
comparable interest—that is, where humans and animals have
roughly the same thing at stake—we ought to give the
animals’ interest no less moral weight than we give humans’
comparable interest. Since many animals can suffer, and
since avoiding suffering is the interest we can most
straightforwardly attribute to these animals, the interest
in avoiding suffering best illustrates what equal
consideration would mean: at a minimum, that the moral
presumption against causing animals to suffer is as strong
as the moral presumption against causing humans to suffer.
Even this minimal claim is very significant. For many types
of animal usage—including not merely factory farming but
also family farming, nearly all animal research, and most
current zoo exhibits—are incompatible with such a strong
presumption against causing animal suffering. Thus whether
animals have rights in this equal-consideration sense is far
more important than whether they have utility-trumping
rights. Despite being a utilitarian, and therefore
rejecting utility-trumping rights, Peter Singer seems to
appreciate that the issue of equal consideration is more
important. Thus, his Animal Liberation stresses
equal consideration rather than utilitarianism in
particular.
Yet it would
distort matters to claim that equal consideration is the
crucial issue in animal ethics. There is no single crucial
issue. The equal-consideration issue is very important, but
so is the prior question of whether animals have moral
status (or rights in that loose sense).
So the
direction of discussion I recommend, in contrast to the
terms encouraged by the aforementioned authors, is to
promote awareness of the many forms of current animal usage
that are indefensible on the modest assumption that animals
have moral status. Factory farming, as I have argued
(somewhat briefly here), is indefensible assuming animals
have moral status. So, I suggest, are standard methods of
the fur industry (even if people in danger of freezing may
permissibly kill animals for their furs). There are other
examples, but we need not consider them here. The key
insight is that, contrary to some authors and activists, we
don’t need to know whether animals have rights in the
utility-trumping sense or even the equal-consideration sense
to know that factory farming, and routinely buying and
eating its products, are indefensible. This represents a
better strategy for criticizing factory farming because it
is maximally broad-based—intuitions about the wrongness of
cruelty being sufficient to launch the argument—rather than
depending on highly controversial moral theses. (While I
believe Singer would accept my argument, his writings tend
to stress the equal-consideration issue in yes or no terms,
not explicitly noting that unequal yet serious consideration
for animals is enough to justify many significant reforms.)
The more we recognize the possibility of justifying
important reforms in this maximally broad-based fashion, the
more we can engage the great majority of people in moral
terms that make sense to them.
David DeGrazia is Professor of Philosophy at George
Washington University, where he has taught since 1989. Among
his publications are Taking Animals Seriously: Mental
Life and Moral Status (Cambrige University Press, 1996)
Human Identity and Bioethics (Cambridge University
Press, 2005).