t
was a dream come true: I had been playing tennis since I was
eleven years of age, and always told myself I had to see
Wimbledon before I died. As I approached sixty, a minor
miracle made this dream come true, and I unexpectedly came
into possession of tickets for Centre Court for the last
five
days of this year’s championship matches. And so, on
June 28, I flew to London, and then planned to spend the
second week of July in Barcelona, visiting friends and
walking around the city. My forthcoming book deals, in
part, with urban design, and one can hardly do better than
Barcelona as a case study of a city that had turned out
right.
As part of my research as well, I had been thinking a lot
about the differences between Europe–in which I do not
include Great Britain–and the United States. This might
also be conceptualized, at least partly, as a difference
between Anglo-Saxon and Latin cultures, or perhaps between
cultures still pursuing an imperial agenda (the U.S. being a
de facto continuation of the British empire) and those that
have long since given it up. Two years ago, the pro-war
neoconservative scholar, Robert Kagan, gave voice to these
differences in an essay called “Power and Weakness,” which
was subsequently expanded into a book, Of Paradise and
Power. Kagan’s argument–that Europeans could indulge
themselves in “feminine” things such as improving the
quality of life only because the “masculine” American
military was protecting them from an external threat–was one
I found misguided and offensive. What external
threat, after all? Kagan never says; but inasmuch as he was
one of the early (1990s) proponents of “regime change” in
Iraq, along with American domination of the globe, his
writings always struck me as being little more than
imperialist apologetics. “Americans,” asserts Kagan, “are
from Mars; Europeans, from Venus.” (“We are not from
Venus,” retorted the German Foreign Minister, Joschka
Fischer, before the United Nations Security Council on the
eve of the Iraq war; “rather, we are the victims of the war
god, Mars”–a nugget of European wisdom that eludes American
militarists like Robert Kagan.)
It was, of course, a measure of the U.S.-European difference
that Kagan’s ideas were heavily excoriated on the European
side of the Atlantic, and regarded as some sort of
conceptual breakthrough in the United States. In fact, the
argument is simplistic, part of the ideological
justifications then being mounted for aggressive action
against a virtually nonexistent enemy, a war that had been
predetermined on what one might call “theological” grounds.
And yet, in an odd way, the comparison is apt. The title of
Kagan’s book captures it very well. Europeans, writes Kagan,
live in a kind of paradise, a world of social welfare,
reliable pensions, long paid vacations, universal health
care, and–not least–gracious and elegant cities. Americans,
on the other hand, live in wastelands such as Dallas and
Atlanta, organize their lives around money, power, and
competition, and, says Kagan, derive much of their
satisfaction in life from “their nation’s military power and
their nation’s special role in the world.” Personally, this
so-called “satisfaction” strikes me as being a species of
existential fraud; but then I’m not exactly a majority voice
on the U.S. scene.
In any case, my arrival in London: the first thing I noticed
was the sense of noise and pressure that pervaded the city.
I had lived in London many years ago; in the wake of the
“Thatcher revolution,” it had become a very different
place. The British are constantly on the go, heavily
stressed out. It seemed like every other person on the
street was talking into a cell phone. Indeed, these gadgets
kept ringing during the match at Wimbledon, occasionally
disturbing the players–despite the fact that the announcer
repeatedly asked patrons to turn their phones off. As I
looked around the stands, I noticed many people staring at
their cell phones or talking on them, instead of watching
the match. Sitting in the lounge of my hotel at night,
quietly reading, I was frequently confronted by hotel guests
bursting in, flipping open their cell phones, and loudly
conducting business as though the place were an extension of
their office. This privatization of public space–the death
of the commons, one might call it–is the by-product of a
world that privileges individual ambition over communal
welfare. In the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher declared that
“society does not exist,” and, like Ronald Reagan, set out
to destroy it. (Lewis Mumford once commented that the U.S.
goal was to collectively live out a private dream.) Both of
them succeeded, pretty much: it became a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The cell phone is merely the coup de grâce.
Mars and Venus, in any case, showed up with stunning clarity
on the tennis court, when (July 3-4) Maria Sharapova
defeated Serena Williams for the women’s championship, and
Roger Federer defeated Andy Roddick for the men’s. I was
delighted to see Venus (the goddess, not the tennis player)
win: in both cases, it was the victory of grace over power
(or even rage). Serena seemed to be bursting with anger;
her only goal was to win. Maria, on the other hand, was
quiet and concentrated, to the point of being meditative;
her goal was to play well. Similarly, Roddick’s approach
was one of brute force, or controlled fury; he had vowed to
“hit the crap out of the ball,” and he did. At first,
Federer was thrown off guard by this, but he finally managed
to regain his balance, and to respond to Roddick’s violence
with finesse. I found it weirdly symbolic to see the
American tennis players, in effect, mirroring U.S. foreign
policy, while the European players were patiently showing
the Americans how to live. ( A lesson lost on them, I
fear.) Back in my hotel room, I listened, that evening, to
a recording of Verdi’s opera, Nabucco–“Oh, mia patria
si bella e perduta!”–and felt sad.
With Wimbledon over, I spent July 5 at the Hopper exhibit at
the Tate Modern. There are few American artists, or even
artists period, whose work is as psychologically haunting as
Edward Hopper’s. In paintings such as Automat (1927)
or Nighthawks (1942) one sees quite clearly the dark
side of the “American Dream”: the isolation and pervasive
melancholy that lurks underneath the surface bombast.
Americans, I thought, must be the loneliest people on earth;
they just don’t know it. Certainly, no one managed to
capture the soullessness of a life devoted to power and
“success” as well as Hopper did; and if, on an unconscious
level, life in the U.S. was this bleak in the 1920s, 30s,
and 40s, what would his paintings look like, I wondered, if
he were alive today? An article on Hopper in Barcelona’s
La Vanguardia Magazine, which I read only a few days
later (July 11), makes just this point: “la pregunta
pertinente es cómo habría pintado los Estados Unidos más
crueles, fundamentalistas y dividados de George W. Bush.”
(The pertinent question is how he would have painted the
crueler, more fundamentalist and divided United States of
George W. Bush.) Hopper, the article concludes, was a
dissident mirror of a society “en aparienca feliz, pero
llena de dudas morales (como ahora), y sobre todo
infinitamente sola.” (happy in appearance, but filled with
moral doubts (like today), and above all infinitely alone)
Part of the process of Americanization, of course, is giving
people the means to hide from the desolation that
Americanization leaves in its wake. Kagan’s comment about
U.S. pride in the nation’s military prowess is one example
of this; religious fundamentalism is another. Really, if
Hopper were to paint Nighthawks today, the people in
the painting would be on cell phones or Prozac, or staring
into TV or computer screens, or stuffing themselves with Big
Macs from McDonalds. I never thought much of the politics
of Jean-Marie Le Pen (to say the least), but when he warns
his countrymen that unless globalization and Americanization
are contained, France could wind up looking like Omaha–well
clearly, the man has a point. Mars has its temptations:
left to its own devices, America could well turn every face
on earth into an empty one, every European café into a scene
out of a Hopper painting.
The comparison kept showing up; I couldn’t get away from
it. That evening (July 5), I went to see Patrice Leconte’s
new film, Confidences trop intimes. The night
before, in my hotel room, I wound up watching a 1997 George
Clooney-Nicole Kidman film on TV, The Peacemakers, a
“romantic” antiterrorist bit of fluff that was so stupid as
to be embarrassing. From the first few frames, absolutely
nothing is in doubt: the golden hero will defeat the evil
enemy threatening the United States and win the pretty
girl. Like most Hollywood stuff, it is as subtle as a train
wreck, and utterly predictable; which is what U.S. audiences
want. It made me think of the recent comment of the vice
president of a major publishing firm in the U.S., that sales
of foreign literature in translation had fallen off
dramatically in the United States during the last few years
because the U.S. public can’t grasp the nuance involved in
the stories, and has no tolerance for ambiguity, which is
particularly characteristic of European fiction. The
contrast between Peacemakers and Confidences,
in any case, couldn’t have been greater in this regard.
Unlike typical Hollywood fare, Leconte’s film is not a
simplistic tale of sex and “romance” (where there is in fact
no real romance), with the plot line being a foregone
conclusion. Rather, the direction of the film takes shape
very gradually, and even at the end, the outcome is not
clear. It demonstrates that uncertainty and
ambiguity–precisely those things that make Americans
anxious–are the things that give life its real sparkle.
But it goes even deeper than this. In the United States, it
is hard to argue for quality of life without being attacked
as an elitist, or for communal solutions to social problems
without being accused of (political) “liberalism” (a word
that evokes horror in the hearts of the majority of the
population). I’ve often thought that our motto, “In God We
Trust,” should be changed to “What’s In It For Me?” It
will, in fact, take something like an act of God to get
Americans to stop using cell phones in public, because
annoying the people around you is not something we worry
about (there is no society, after all, in our world
view–just individual “atoms”). Collective decisions for the
common weal are quite rare in a laissez-faire society. Some
time ago the American author Stephen King made an offer to
his readers at large, that he would write his next novel
online if 75% of those reading it would agree to download
each completed chapter for the nominal fee of one dollar.
If more than 25% failed to pay for the book-in-progress, he
would simply quit writing, and everybody would lose out. It
was quite a bargain, given the cost of new hardback books
these days. How did the U.S. public respond? But of
course, you know the answer: nearly half acted out of
individual greed rather than community responsibility–i.e.,
downloaded the book without paying for it–and so King pulled
the plug. The point is that extreme individualism is very
powerful, much like an aggressive cancer, whereas communal
arrangements tend to be very fragile. The laissez-faire
mentality can invade and disrupt a culture overnight, as it
were; after which it becomes very difficult to revert to
status quo ante.
In any case, I arrived in Barcelona around 7 p.m. on July 7,
and took a taxi to Esplugues, where I was staying. As I
walked the streets later that evening, I turned off Laurea
Miro and onto a very long courtyard, tucked away from the
main street. The pavement was done in brick, there were
lots of benches to sit on, and to my left was a “center for
culture and recreation.” It was a pedestrian zone, and
issued out onto a park. The first thing I was struck by was
the beauty of the design, in a “suburb” of sorts that wasn’t
particularly fancy. The whole courtyard area was oriented
to human social life. The second thing I felt, after a week
in London, was the palpable atmosphere of relaxation and
friendliness, as people interacted with one another. Unlike
London, and much of the U.S., people here are not alone:
they were clustered in groups of six or more, engaged in
relaxed or animated conversation. I suddenly realized how
harsh London was, how solitary, how high-pressured. (And
how expensive: the metro fare starts at about four dollars,
the same for a cup of tea, and a simple lunch easily goes
for about twenty dollars.) Clearly, the pure
laissez-faire life, in which everybody is out for
themselves, exacts an enormous toll; but perhaps there is
also something about Anglo-Saxon cultures that is simply
unloving, I’m not sure. I stood at a kiosk, noticing how
much was going on in terms of meetings and cultural events.
While I was doing this, two men came up and posted a notice
for meetings of the Associació Catalana Contra la
Contaminació Acústica (Catalan Association Against Noise
Pollution). Like all the other posters, it was in Catalan;
I could read about half of it. After the men left, I went
over to a family sitting on a bench and asked the father if
he could translate for me from Catalan to Spanish. (How
easy this–approaching a complete stranger–was to do!) He
said that it was an association dedicated to decreasing the
noise level in Catalonia, including scooters, traffic, loud
music, etc. He added that Barcelona was much noisier now
than it had been just ten years ago. As I looked around at
the large courtyard and cultural center, I noticed another
big difference from London: no cell phones were in use, even
among teenagers. Whereas I would guess that in London, the
ratio of cell phone use on the street is one out of every
two or three people, in Barcelona it is something like
1:100. In terms of having a sense of social cohesion–not to
mention relative quiet–it makes an enormous difference.
July 8. I buy a copy of El País. On page 6, there
is an interview with Patrus Ananias de Souza, Brazil’s
“Ministro del Hambre Cero” (Minister of Zero Hunger)–can one
imagine such a cabinet post in England or the U.S.?–who is
quoted as saying, “El desarollo económico no es suficiente
para promover la igualidad.” (Economic development is
insufficient to promote equality.) Neoliberal
globalization, he went on to say, is merely financial in
nature; authentic globalization, on the other hand, is about
human rights, management of the media, the Kyoto Protocol,
ethical values, building peace... Tell it to the Bush
administration, I thought; although the Democrats, it must
be said, are only slightly better. Neither of the two major
parties envisions a truly different way of life beyond that
of corporate consumerism, and that way of life is in the
process of destroying all other ways of life. A poster for
the Forum, a five-month-long conference on cultural
diversity, sustainability, and peace, proclaims in Catalan:
“A Barcelona volem canviar el món” (In Barcelona we wish to
change the world); and I thought: good luck! I suspect that
the U.S. will Americanize Barcelona long before this great
Catalan city can even hope to Barcelonize the U.S. After
centuries of tumult and torment, the Spanish have become a
practical people. After March 11, with nearly two hundred
dead and the threat of terrorism hanging over them, they did
the sensible thing: got rid of the toady who hitched his
career to George W. Bush and the phony war in Iraq, and
voted in a democratic socialist government, the only type of
government that is reasonable for the Western industrial
nations, in my opinion. If an al-Qaeda attack had occurred
in the U.S. prior to the November 2 election, Americans,
being a “theological” people rather than a practical
one, would surely have clung to Bush; nor will they ever
consider electing a democratic socialist government–this
would be beyond the pale. As the U.S. historian Richard
Hofstadter once put it, “It is America’s fate not to have
ideologies, but to be one.”
July 13: I open the London Guardian and read that the
Bush administration and the Department of Justice have been
exploring ways in which the presidential election in
November might be legally postponed, in the event of a
potential terrorist threat. For the first time in the
history of the U.S., the government is actually talking
about canceling a presidential election. Is this really
happening?
Two weeks later, I’m back home in Washington, DC. It’s
about 9 a.m., and I get on the elevator in my building.
There are three other people there, and I say, “Good
morning!” as I walk on. They just stare at me, as though I
had spoken in Urdu, or was initiating the opening phase of
some bizarre and dangerous ritual. Normally, I just give
up; nonresponse is pretty common in the land of Edward
Hopper, where the citizens are so stressed out that they
wall off the world as a reflex. But this morning, still
carrying the glow of “Venus” inside me, I don’t want to
throw in the towel, I don’t want to accept this profoundly
antisocial value system. “What?” I exclaim; “nobody says
‘Good morning’?” Embarrassed, they fall over themselves now
to reply to my greeting. For a brief moment, I shocked them
into base-level civility. But as I and they well know, it’s
not going to last.
There is no doubt about it: I am home!
Postscript, June-July 2005:
I returned to Barcelona
almost exactly a year later, to complete a certification
program I had been working on to teach English as a
second language. My fears that the United States would
Americanize Barcelona proved to be disturbingly well
founded, though I never imagined that the process would
happen so quickly. In the preceding twelve months, it
seemed as though there was a tenfold increase in the use
of cell phones. Suddenly, Barcelona was noisy as hell.
As in London–not quite as bad, but almost–people were
walking down the street, oblivious to their
surroundings, mentally removed from the physical and
social environment, and yelling into their phones. The
din was incredible, and the city now had a distinctly
American commercial flavor to it. I reflected that the
combination of extreme individualism and endless
high-tech innovation (toys for adults, when you get
right down to it) was a lethal formula, virtually
irresistible, moving through the world like a cancer,
and destroying silence and society in its wake. But the
sense of Spanish grace, much to my relief, wasn’t
completely gone. If you are sitting at a café with a
stranger (or are together on an elevator), they will say
goodbye as they take their leave. Sales personnel still
make eye contact and smile at you as they hand you your
change, a dramatic difference from the sullen
indifference of their counterparts in DC. On the metro
with two friends, I was amazed as one woman, sitting in
one of three seats in a row, got up and moved across the
car, gesturing for us to sit down, having moved so that
the three of us could sit together. I read an article in
La Vanguardia about a social experiment being
conducted in Catalonia, of putting young people in their
early twenties together with elderly folks in their late
eighties, as roommates–an experiment that was proving to
be remarkably successful. So Spain is not America yet,
not totally globalized and homogenized; but given what
happened in one year, I shudder to think of what will
happen in five. The American goal, then: life without
love, without community, and above all–without a
moment’s peace.
Morris Berman is
a cultural historian and social critic living in
Washington, DC, and since 2003 a Visiting Professor in
Sociology at the Catholic University of America. His
published works include
The Twilight of American Culture, named a “Notable
Book” by the New York Times Book Review, and Dark
Ages America, being released by W.W. Norton in 2006.