This Marcusean epiphany gave birth to a conference
celebrating the 50th anniversary of
Eros and Civilization at St. Joseph’s University
in Philadelphia in November 2005. During this very
successful conference the participants established
an International Marcuse Society. A couple of weeks
after the conference I had a conversation with Peter
Marcuse. Peter reminded me that the main theme of
Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man is that
our society is basically irrational. Peter wondered
why there was this renewed interest in his father’s
work since it does seem to be the case that our
society has become one-dimensional and irrational.
My response was that in a time like this, a time
wherein it seems that his father’s work is
irrelevant, it is most relevant. That is, Marcuse’s
work is still relevant because it describes in great
detail the very social mechanisms that have
prevented positive social change in our society.
Marcuse explained the ways in which irrationality
has come to replace rationality. However, his
critique of the erasure of rationality and the
containment of non-repressive possibilities also
embodies the possibility for liberation and a more
rational or reasonable society. I will elaborate on
this further latter in this essay.
While my students and I had a Marcusean epiphany in
the fall of 2001, I discovered that we were not the
only ones. As I continued to do more research on
Marcuse I discovered that there was already a
revival of Marcuse’s work taking place. It was
obvious to me that Marcuse was not finished speaking
to us literally and figuratively. While Marcuse
still speaks to us through the relevance of his
classic works, he also continues to speak through
new works. I was delighted to discover that six
volumes of Marcuse’s essays and letters (most of
which were never published) were scheduled to be
published in English. In this essay I want to
examine the relevance of Marcuse’s voice in the 21th
century by examining the issues raised in the three
recently published volumes of Marcuse’s unpublished
works.
Although there are many issues addressed in these
three volumes, this essay will focus on three themes
that seem to stand out or at least provide us with a
particular orientation. These issues are social
change, democracy, and one-dimensionality. I will
begin with the problem of social change which will
be examined in two parts. As a dialectical thinker
Marcuse was always sensitive to the possibilities
for social change while at the same time he was very
aware of the impediments to social change. This has
made reading Marcuse difficult for some who would
like to make a decisive claim about the direction in
which our society is headed. Marcuse’s analysis of
social change does not make it possible for one to
make a decisive claim about the direction in which
society is headed but it does make one aware of the
potential for change and the potential for further
repression. With this awareness one is in a better
position to develop a strategy for social change.
Hence, Marcuse never gives in to the paralysis of
pessimism or the opiate effect of blind optimism.
During the 1940s Marcuse and his Frankfurt School
colleague Franz Neumann were working together on a
theory of social change. Several of their essays
have been published in Volume One of Marcuse’s
unpublished works entitled Technology, War and
Fascism. Before addressing the problem of
social change it is necessary that we first
understand what social change is according to
Marcuse and Neumann. In the essay “Theories of
Social Change” Marcuse and Neumann argue that up to
the 18th century the theory of social
change has always been a philosophical theory.
Marcuse and Neumann briefly outline the history of
theories on social change that was to be examined in
greater detail in a future work. Of importance to
us here is the transition of theories of social
change from static to dialectical.
Marcuse and Neumann write:
The dialectical conception of change was first
elaborated in Hegel’s philosophy. It reversed the
traditional logical setting of the problem by taking
change as the very form of existence, and by taking
existence as a totality of objective
contradictions. Every particular form of existence
contradicts its content, which can develop only
through breaking this form and creating a new one in
which the content appears in a liberated and more
adequate form.[1]
They continue:
Social change was no longer an event occurring in or
to a more or less static system, but the very
modus existentiae of the system, and the
question was not how and why changes took place but
how and why an at least provisional stability and
order was accomplished.[2]
The above passages contain a type of inquiry that is
central to all of Marcuse’s work. Every text by
Marcuse is an exercise in the above type of
dialectic.
Static theories of social change see society as
basically stable or static. Social change occurs as
a rupture or a sudden alteration of the previously
stable society. On the dialectical view society is
always undergoing alteration. Although change is a
part of the very structure of society, there are
moments of stability and order. It is also possible
for a society to undergo change and maintain a
certain order or stability at the same time. For
example, one may consider the ways in which advanced
industrial societies have changed while maintaining
their capitalist form of production.
Marcuse’s concern is with the way in which societies
are able to prohibit social change, that is, the way
in which a certain social structure achieves
stability. More specifically, the question is how
do oppressive, repressive, dehumanizing, social
structures maintain themselves against the possible
resistance by those who suffer from these
structures? The achievement of stability by
oppressive societies is a central theme in volumes
one and two of Marcuse’s unpublished works as well
as his focus in One-Dimensional Man.
Much of Marcuse’s work involves an attempt to rescue
individuality as a source for resistance. The
erasure of individuality is the path toward
one-dimensionality. In his essay “Some Social
Implications of Modern Technology” Marcuse examines
the ways in which technology affects individuality
in advanced industrial societies. Marcuse makes an
important distinction between technics and
technology. He begins the essay, “In this article,
technology is taken as a social process in which
technics proper (that is, the technical apparatus of
industry, transportation, communication) is but a
partial factor.” Technics is not necessarily
oppressive nor is it necessarily liberating, but
rather, it has the potential for either. Marcuse
uses the term technology to refer to social forces
and structures that determine the use of technics.
He writes:
Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality
of instruments, devices and contrivances which
characterize the machine age is thus at the same
time a mode of organizing and perpetuating (or
changing) social relationships, a manifestation of
prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an
instrument for control and domination.[3]
What Marcuse refers to as technology is an
oppressive and repressive use of technics. This
theme also occurs in Marcuse’s more well-known
writings such as Eros and Civilization and
One-Dimensional Man. Technology does not refer
to the instruments used for production in advanced
industrial societies but rather to a kind of social
logic or rationality that determines the use of
these instruments.
In
the above mentioned article Marcuse examines the way
in which critical rationality and individuality has
been replaced by technological rationality. His
position is similar to that developed by Adorno and
Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment and
his own position in his more well-known works.
Technological rationality is similar to what
Horkheimer called instrumental reason. The
technological society is the same as what the
Frankfurt School called the administered society.
Even in these early essays Marcuse is laying the
foundation for the long-term preoccupation of
Frankfurt School critical theory.
In
“Some Social Implications of Modern Technology”
Marcuse argues:
In the course of the technological process a new
rationality and new standards on individuality have
spread over society, different from and even opposed
to those which initiated the march of technology.[4]
The march of technology has its origins in the
desire for greater human autonomy and more control
by the human being over the circumstances of his or
her life. However, instead of increasing autonomy
technological progress has actually reduced human
autonomy. Technological progress has led to the
development of a value system wherein the individual
human person is not given the highest value but
instead the technological apparatus has been given
the highest value. The individual must conform to
the demands of technological rationality. This
conformity to the demands of technological
rationality adumbrates what Marcuse calls in Eros
and Civilization the performance principle.
That is, in our society real needs go unmet while
new needs are created. Everyone thinks that he or
she must have the latest thing. We are even told
what to desire. We should all have a certain type
of body, a cell phone, an ipod, etc…
In
the second volume of these unpublished works,
Towards a Critical Theory of Society, Marcuse
continues to examine the ways in which
technologically advanced societies prohibit the
autonomy of the individual and resist social
change. In an essay entitled “The Problem of Social
Change in the Technological Society” he writes:
One of the accomplishments of advanced industrial
civilization is the non-terroristic, democratic
decline of freedom -- the efficient, smooth,
reasonable unfreedom which seems to have its roots
in technological progress itself.[5]
According to Marcuse, our technological society is
still an oppressive one. For example, we need only
think about social status of women, racial
minorities, and the poor. Further, there is still
the class based dichotomy between the “haves” and
the “have nots”. Marcuse claims that although
technological society is still oppressive, it
nevertheless, contains the seeds of liberation.
Indeed, in the technological society that seems to
be the dialectical relationship between oppression
and liberation.
In
this essay, Marcuse examines the way in which the
technological society can oppress without employing
the obvious tools of oppression, i.e., sheer
physical domination. It is this ability to oppress
surreptitiously that Marcuse calls the non-terroristic
or democratic decline of freedom. For example,
through political rhetoric people can be duped into
making decisions that are to their disadvantage.
One only needs to think about how the use of fear of
an external threat can persuade people to vote for a
political candidate who cares nothing about the
interest of the people. We have also seen political
figures play on people’s fear of sexual difference.
Also, with respect to technology, many people are
given just enough of the benefits of the
technological society that they are afraid of
rebelling for fear that they may lose what they
have. Even the poorest homes have a TV set. There
are two issues that must be raised here. First,
Marcuse’s analyzes the way in which technological
society oppress and repel movements of social
change. Secondly, Marcuse’s view of technology is
not totally pessimistic. He actually saw in
technology the potential for liberation and the
fulfillment of human life. Kellner writes in a
footnote:
Marcuse’s contribution, published here, analyzes
social change in technological society, anticipating
his theses of One-Dimensional Man that
technological development was a threat to freedom,
individualism, democracy and other positive
values—but also created the pre-conditions for
greater freedom, equality, justice, and so on that
the organization of contemporary industrial
societies were blocking.[6]
The issue then is not merely technology but the
social organization of the technological society.
Technology itself has the potential to free human
beings from perpetual toil and the threat of
scarcity. However, this liberating potential of
technology can be actualized only under certain
social conditions or organization. Oppression in a
technological society reflects the social
organization of that society.
Although the present social organization of American
society leads to the oppressive use of technology,
alternative uses are present in our society in the
form of liberal, democratic values. However, these
values are not “facts” and in a fact orientated
society normative values are rarely taken
seriously. Marcuse writes:
Prior to their realization, historical alternatives
appear and disappear as “values”, professed as
preferential by certain groups or individuals. In
social theory as well as in any other field, values
are not facts; facts, as facts, are not values and
are opposed to values.[7]
This is a very important passage and it reflects
Marcuse’s emphasis on dialectic. The point is that
present social reality has not actualized its
potential. Even the principle of freedom on which
American society is based has not been fully
actualized. Society as it now stands contains
within itself its own contradictions and its
liberating alternatives. However, this
contradiction between facts and values must be
mediated by historical, political practice. The
values must become facts through social change.
Social change occurs when the “facts” (society as it
is) are transcended. Society already contains the
seeds for its own transcendence. However, social
change is prohibited when the “facts” are taken out
of their historical context. Marcuse writes:
These facts are substantially incomplete,
ambivalent: they are elements in a larger context of
historical space and time. Insulation against this
context falsifies the facts and their function in
the society because it insulates the facts against
their negation, i.e., against the forces which make
for their transcendence toward modes of existence
rendered possible and at the same time precluded by
their given society.[8]
When the “facts” are viewed in their historical
context they disclose their contingency. They also
reveal their negation, i.e., other possible modes of
existence for that society. These other modes of
existence are important to the extent that they help
society achieve its “optimal development.”
One of the most interesting and challenging essays
in volume 2 is “The Individual and the Great
Society” which is a critique of President Lyndon
Johnson’s program of a “Great Society”. This essay
discloses the way in which social change is
paralyzed by a refusal to critique the very social
framework wherein change must occur. Those of us
who have taught Business Ethics are all too familiar
with this problem. That is, certain ethical
problems cannot be reduced to the choices of
individuals working within the capitalist framework,
but rather, there are ethical problems that require
a critique of the capitalist system. Marcuse agrees
with Johnson’s utopian vision but Johnson attempts
to remain within the capitalist framework. The
question for Marcuse is whether the present society
is amenable to the “Great Society” or must the
present society be transformed.
Marcuse contrasts the Great Society with the
Capitalist Enterprise and takes issue with the first
feature of Johnson’s Great Society. That is, a
society of “unbridled growth,” creates a spirit of
competition which undermines the Great Society.
Further, Johnson stated that in the Great Society
“the meaning of our lives matches the marvelous
products of our labor.”[9]
Marcuse wonders: “Shouldn’t it be the other way
around? In a free society, the meaning of life is
determined by the free individuals, who determine
the products of their labor accordingly.”[10]
With respect to “unbridled growth” Marcuse says:
The dynamic of endlessly propelled productivity is
not that of a peaceful human society in which the
individuals have come into their own and developed
their humanity, the challenge they meet may be
precisely that of protecting and preserving a “safe
harbor,” a “resting place” where life is no longer
spent in the struggle for existence. And such a
society may well reject the notion (and practice) of
“unbridled growth”; it may well restrict its
technical capabilities where they threaten to
increase the dependence of man on his instruments
and products.[11]
Marcuse’s point is that Johnson’s model of the Great
Society is based on capitalist interests. The
interests of capitalism is not necessarily amenable
to the humanity and happiness of individuals. On
Johnson’s model, production and economic growth are
primary. The meaning of human life is determined by
the product of labor. This view is ultimately
destructive of the individual. The individual is
used in the service of production and not for the
individual.
Marcuse’s concern here is first, our society is
rapidly becoming one-dimensional. Secondly, what
possibility is there for the development of autonomy
and creativity for the individual in a
one-dimensional society? Finally, how can a
one-dimensional society become a Great Society?
Marcuse argues that as advanced industrial society
becomes one-dimensional the individual wanes in
significance. With respect to the situation of the
individuals who are suppose to build the Great
Society Marcuse writes:
They live in a society where they are (for good or
bad) subjected to an apparatus which, comprising
production, distribution, and consumption, material
and intellectual work and leisure, politics and fun,
determines their daily existence, their needs and
aspirations. And this life, private, social, and
rational, is enclosed in a very specific historical
universe. The individuals who make up the bulk of
the population in the “affluent societies” live in a
universe of permanent defense and aggression.[12]
It
is in this critique of Johnson’s speech that we
encounter the significance and ongoing relevance of
Marcuse’s form of critical theory. First, Johnson’s
call for the development of the Great Society
requires some degree of social change. However, it
is not clear what type of change. In fact, as
Johnson goes on to describe this Great Society we
see that he is locked into a framework that is
resistant to social change if change means
liberation. Johnson invokes the abstract economic
vocabulary of production and economic growth. No
attention is paid to the quality of life of the
individuals living in such a society. In this
respect, Johnson simply reinvents the wheel.
Therefore, real emancipatory social change is
contained.
Changes in our society do not necessarily reflect
progress. The careful observer may see in social
transformation a perpetual re-birth of the old.
Change is not equivalent to emancipation. Hence,
cultural revolution is not necessarily political
revolution. Political revolution is often absorbed
by cultural revolution (rebellion). Marcuse argues
that the cultural revolution has emancipatory
potential but must extend itself to the political.
The cultural revolution is not yet political because
it is the reaction of a particular, marginalized,
social group. Here we must see what is emancipatory
and yet problematic in this movement. Marcuse
writes:
Now in its striving for totality, the cultural
revolution is discovering (or rather recapturing) a
neglected or suppressed basis of revolution, namely,
its roots in the individual—more specifically, in
the sensibility of man. In truly dialectical
fashion, it is in a new individual that a new
totality of life is to emerge. The new society is
to originate in the individuals themselves: not as
the result of a fictitious consent or contract, not
as the marketplace of competing interests and votes,
but as an extension, natural as well as rational, of
the needs and faculties of free men. This freedom
begins with the emancipation of the human senses.[13]
Marcuse claims that the sensibility of man as the
basis of social revolution goes back to Fourier and
Marx. He argues that many social revolutions fail
because because they tend to replace one ruling
class with another. They fail to transform the
sensibility of persons. These movements are thus,
immature. While these movements are immature in
terms of productive forces, material and
intellectual, Marcuse claims:
But one aspect of this immaturity is precisely the
suppression, and atrophy, of the roots of liberation
in the instinctual structures of the individuals,
and consequently, in their sensibility.[14]
Marcuse was always aware of our instinctual needs
and the ways in which these needs are repressed and
altered by the organization of society. The failed
revolutions discussed by Marcuse failed because they
attempt change at a very superficial level. They
attempted to change society without recognizing the
need to change our distorted sensibility. In this
respect, change often fails to break with the old
society. Marcuse is critical of a continuum from
the old society to the new, but, negation requires a
break with the old which perpetuates unfreedom.
Marcuse warns us that as society changes the base
for qualitative change itself changes. This is why
dialectical theory must be committed to history.
This is also why Marcuse always renewed his search
for the revolutionary subject. The vicissitudes of
critical theory lies in its attempt to remain
committed to history rather than ossified,
ahistorical, apriori concepts. Our “democracy” is
based on a loose use of ossified, a priori,
ahistorical concepts without a commitment to history
and its vicissitudes. The base of human society is
always a human creation and is therefore malleable.
Marcuse’s attitude toward social change and
democracy is very complex. There are several places
in his work where he is very critical of democracy.
For example, in the third volume of his unpublished
works in a conversation with Hans Magnus
Enzensberger Marcuse cites William Shirer who
claimed that “American fascism will probably be the
first which comes to power by democratic means and
with democratic support.”[15]
In another essay entitled “The Historical Fate of
Bourgeois Democracy” from volume 2 Marcuse is
critical of democracy. In this essay Marcuse
grapples with the victory of Nixon in the 1972
elections and Nixon’s attitude toward Vietnam. The
main focus is not Nixon per se but the willingness
of the American people to follow such a leader.
Marcuse claims that “this democracy has become the
most powerful obstacle to change – except change for
the worst.”[16]
He argues:
Bourgeois democracy is giving itself an enlarged
popular base which supports the liquidation of
remnants of the liberal period, the removal of
government from popular control, and allows the
pursuit of the imperialist policy. The shibboleth
of democracy: government of the people and by the
people (self-government) now assumes the form of a
large-scale identification of the people with
rulers – caricature of popular sovereignty.[17]
He
continues:
In new ways: because the interplay between
production and destruction, liberty and repression,
power and submission (i.e., the unity of opposites
which permeates the entire capitalist society today)
has, with the help of technological means not
previously available, created, among the underlying
populations, a mental structure which responds to,
and reflects the requirements of the system. In
this mental structure are the deep individual,
instinctual roots of the identification of the
conformist majority with the institutionalized
brutality and aggression. An instinctual, nay,
libidinal affinity binds, beneath all rational
justification, the subjects to the rulers.[18]
Marcuse shows here that in an oppressive, repressive
society the mental structure of individuals is
affected in such a way that protest is mitigated.
He argues:
In the American democracy today, the government is
by definition (because it was elected by the people,
and because it is the government) immune against
subversion, and it is (by the same definition) safe
from any other than verbal criticism and a
congressional opposition which can easily be
managed.[19]
Marcuse argues that the new left must defend
democracy while attacking its capitalist
foundations. He calls for what seems to be a
Nietzschean transvaluation of values. Democracy
requires a counter culture to the present system.
Here Marcuse finds hope in liberation movements such
as the Women’s Liberation Movement. However, before
addressing Marcuse’s search for catalyst groups we
must examine his criticism of American democracy a
bit further.
Marcuse looked at American democracy through
dialectical lenses, as he did all things. American
democracy is at best an honorable experiment that is
nowhere near completion. As Marcuse says in a panel
discussion entitled “Democracy Has/Hasn’t a Future…
a Present” published in volume three “So I would say
democracy certainly has a future. But in my view it
certainly does not have a present.”[20]
He goes on to say:
Within the established society we no longer have a
majority constituted on the basis of the completely
free development of opinion and consciousness. We
do not have a majority constituted on the basis of
free and equal access to the facts and all the
facts. We do not have a majority constituted on the
basis of equal education for all.
However, we do have a majority which is standardized
and manipulated and even constituted by standardized
and administered information, communication and
education. In other words, this majority is not
free, but it belongs to the very essence of
democracy that people who are sovereign are a free
people.[21]
The above passage is an adequate description of our
anti-democratic situation. American democracy is
characterized by what Marcuse calls in
One-Dimensional Man “a comfortable, smooth,
reasonable, democratic unfreedom.”[22]
It is ironic that in a country that has yet to
actualize its democratic potential wars are waged
for the purpose of making the world safe for
democracy. Americans have bought into a very
truncated view of democracy. That is, democratic
freedom has been reduced to the power to vote for
political leaders. However, Marcuse reminds us in
One-Dimensional Man that the ability to chose
one master over another does not abolish slavery.
In
the forties, fifties, and sixties Marcuse was well
aware of many of the problems with American
democracy that recent theorists have disclosed.
Theorists from Iris Marion Young to Jane Mansbridge
have pointed out the problems of aggregative
democracy or democracy based solely on voting or the
aggregation of opinions. The deeper issue is the
process of opinion-formation. That is, we vote for
candidates who seem best to reflect our own
opinions. There are several problems here. Fisrt,
we may be dupped by the candidate. Secondly, once
in office the candidate may reveal his/her true
opinion which is contrary to our reason for voting
for this candidate. Third, we do not have adequate
means for holding our candidates accountable for
their decisions. Finally, and more importantly, our
own opinions may be repressive, oppressive and
dehumanizing for those outside of our own social
group.
It
is this last problem that I will focus on for the
remainder of this essay. This problem also seems to
be at the heart of Marcuse’s works from beginning to
end. One of the main goals of the Frankfurt School
of Social Research was to understand why people who
would benefit most from social change are not only
the least likely to advocate social change but may
very well become the greatest obstacles to social
change. For this reason the Frankfurt School
incorporated Freudian psychoanalysis as an essential
part of their critical social theory.
Psychoanalysis would help them understand the way in
which people became victims of false consciousness.
The synthesis of psychoanalysis with its focus on
the development of the psyche of the individual and
the problem of repressed desires with the Marxist
analysis of oppressive social structures opens the
door for a deeper understanding of the undemocratic,
oppressive, and repressive process of
opinion-formation.
Simply put, the process of opinion-formation is a
social process and is affected by the formation of
values, world views, political rhetoric, fear,
social structures etc… It is very easy to
manipulate the process of opinion-formation in
individuals and groups by concealing certain facts
while disclosing others. For example, one can
reveal to white working class males that some women
and racial minorities have benefited from the
practice of affirmative action. However, what is
concealed in the long history of oppression that put
women and racial minorities at a great
disadvantage. Further, the fact that the greatest
enemy of the white working class male is not women
and racial minorities but rather wealthy white males
who are willing to exploit anyone in their path for
greater wealth. Hence, those who are at the bottom
of the socio/economic ladder are put at war against
each other. Those at the top of the socio/economic
ladder have every thing to gain from the present
order of things and much to lose from social
change.
We
have seen this social and political manipulation on
a large scale since 9/11. The threat from an
external force has allowed the present
administration to make light of our civil liberties
and our freedom of speech. We are admonished to
focus on the threat from outside while ignoring the
threat from within. Before 9/11 millions of
Americans lived in poverty without adequate
education, food, housing, jobs, and other
necessities. However, to be critical of a
government that allows such poverty is to be
“anti-American”. To oppose the war with Iraq is
taken as a lack of support for our troops. The
truth is that opposition to this war is perhaps the
best way to support our troops who are viewed by our
government as dispensable. This should seem obvious
since most of our troops are from poor families.
Those who are bold enough to wage war are rarely
bold enough to send their own children to fight. It
is as if the poor are condemned to protect the
interest of the rich. The fact that our troops are
predominately made up of poor working class people
should be up for debate or questioning. This would
be a sign of a true democracy.
Marcuse’s theory of social change entails a vision
of a new society that would not merely benefit those
at the top of the socio/economic ladder but all
persons in that society. All persons would have
equal access to information for free
opinion-formation. All persons would play a larger
role in the decision making process.
It
is to Marcuse’s credit that he not only saw the
impediments to social change in every epoch but he
also saw potential for liberation. His engagement
with and influence on the new left is important
here. It is to Marcuse’s credit that he remained
flexible in his theorizing so as to avoid stale
orthodoxy and to remain current. In the sixties
Marcuse was a fresh voice for socially conscious
youth who had a broader range of concerns than the
Old Left. In the introduction to the third volume
Kellner writes:
While the Old Left embraced Soviet Marxism and the
Soviet Union, the New Left combined forms of
critical Marxism with radical democracy and openness
to a broad array of ideas and political alliances.
Whereas the Old Left was doctrinaire and
puritanical, the New Left was pluralistic and
engaged emergent cultural forms and social
movements. While the Old Left, with some
exceptions, tended to impose doctrinal conformity
and cut itself off from “liberal” groups, the New
Left embraced a wide range of social movements
around the issues of class, gender, race, sexuality,
the environment, peace, and other issues.[23]
Volume Three The New Left and the 1960s
contains essays and interviews by Marcuse at the
height of his popularity and influence. The essays
in this volume contain Marcuse’s praise for and
criticisms of the New Left. One of the most
important aspects of Marcuse’s relation to the New
Left is his continuous search for what Kellner calls
the revolutionary subject. The source of possible
revolution was not only the working class but other
groups as well.
The latter Marcuse saw potential for revolution or
social change in what he referred to as catalyst
groups. The social movements of the 60s were
potential revolutionary moments wherein certain
social groups had become very discontent with the
present order of things. The Civil Rights Movement,
student rebellions, and feminism all were responses
to our repressive society.
Although there does not seem to be as much social
unrest as there was in the 60s we still find
ourselves in a similar situation. Many social
groups still struggle for equality, recognition, and
full democratic participation. While dejure
racial segregation has been overcome we still suffer
from defacto racial segregation. Gays,
Lesbians, and transgendered people have not yet been
accepted as full citizens with the same rights and
respect as their heterosexual counterparts. The gap
between the rich and the poor continues to grow at
an alarming rate. Women still struggle for first
class citizenship, etc… I have catalogued only a
few problems that we face in our present society.
Marcuse’s form of critical theory is still a
necessary tool for examining the possibility for
social change as well as the impediments to social
change. Unfortunately, Marcuse has been put on the
shelf too quickly. Our time calls for a revival of
Marcusean critical theory. These new volumes make
an important contribution to the revival of
Marcuse’s theory.
Notes
[1] “Theories of Social
Change” In Technology, War and Fascism,
page 130.
[3] “Some Social
Implications of Modern Technology” In
Technology, War and Fascism, page 41.
[6] Towards a Critical
Theory of Society, page 36.
[7] “The Problem of Social
Change in the Technological Society” In
Towards a Critical Theory of
Society,
page 38.
[13] “Cultural Revolution”
In Towards a Critical Theory of Society,
page 124.
[15] “USA: Question of
Organization and the Revolutionary Subject”
In The New Left and the
1960s, page
138.
[16] Towards a Critical
Theory of Society, page 165.
[20] In The New Left
and the 1960s, page 88.
[22] Marcuse, Herbert
One-Dimensional Man (Boston, Beacon
Press, 1966) page 1.