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The Bush
reign ended symbolically with hurricane Kathrina. When
the news media talked about “refugees” fleeing New Orleans;
when the TV showed the terrible scenes of those unable to flee
who were left to fend for themselves in a football stadium—or,
when I was asked a few days later to appear on a talk radio
show to explain what Hobbes meant by the state of nature as a
“war of all against all” – it was clear that something finally
had snapped. The failure to find the supposed WMD in Iraq,
the grotesque photos from Abu Graib prison, and the manifest
twisting of national and international law at Guantanamo had
not hit home until that terrible storm of August 2005 and its
aftermath. From that point on, as if a faultily knitted
sweater began to untangle its formerly connected warp and
woof, the one loose thread began to unwrap the intricate
deception.
Katrina revealed first the
incompetence of a government that had won re-election by its
promise to protect its citizens. The agency responsible for
dealing with natural disasters had lost its independence when
it became part of the gigantic Department of Homeland Defense
created in the wake of 9/11. Its incompetence, second, was
seen to be the result of a kind of corruption that had seeped
into an administration that had no tolerance for a loyal
opposition even within its own ranks; it was a regime without
checks and balances. This was connected, third, to a
totalizing project that placed its friends everywhere within
the power structure (including among the lobbyists: this was
the moment of the Jack Abramoff scandal, in whose wake at
least two Congressmen are now in jail); political loyalty
rather than competence were rewarded. It became clear,
finally, that this corruption was a threat to the republic; it
was not just private self-enrichment but an attack on the
“virtue” that is the basis of any political republic.
Against this background, another
consequence of the Bush political machine took on a greater
importance: those “refugees” from New Orleans were mainly
black, and they were poor.[1] In one sense, this was not
surprising; but in the classical republican framework that
Americans were vaguely remembering, the racial and economic
inequality took on a different weight: it was a source of
shame. As opposed to guilt, which is internalized and
individual, shame exists in the eyes of others and calls for
social remedies. The political autism of Bush’s foreign
policy is put into question by the rediscovery of shame; one
need not be a specialist in foreign policy to know that
America’s reputation has been sullied, nor an idealist to
recall that it was once, and can again be guided by better
hands.
In this context, the now
widespread call for “change” reflects a resurgence of the
still-present republican spirit that has characterized
America when it is at its best, which is, alas, not
always the case. At present, according to a survey by the
Wall Street Journal and NBC News just prior to the beginning
of the primaries, 24% of Americans, whatever their partisan
choice, desire “small adjustments,” 29% want “moderate
correction,” while a massive 46% yearn for “major reforms” and
a “brand-new” approach to politics.
But the appeal to a “republican
spirit” is shot full of ambiguity; the Republican party has
its own claims to the label. Classical republicanism assumed
the existence of a “common good” beyond the difference of
interests among the citizenry, which were to be sacrificed if
necessary. And, in foreign policy, its universalism can
become imperial, with unpredictable domestic consequences.[2]
I will return to these ambiguities and hopes at the end of
these remarks.
The ambiguities of the classical
republican project suggest that the Bush junior regime can be
seen as the radical heir to Reagan’s America’s Back!
After the Clinton interregnum, the neo-conservatives (who did
not include Bush, or Rice) set out to realize goals that they
had proposed privately at the end of the government of Bush
senior [3], and then elaborated publicly in the 1997 “Project
for a New American Century.” Their goals dove-tailed nicely
with the outsized dreams and underhanded methods of Republican
party leaders captivated by Karl Rove’s ambitious plan laying
the grounds for a long-term domestic hegemony modeled on Mark
Hanna’s creation of the McKinley presidency in 1896, during
which Spain was driven from the New World and the Philippines
conquered (at the cost of a long and costly guerrilla war).
Financial support was assured by hitherto unheard of tax cuts
to the wealthiest segments of society, creating a wealth-gap
that recalled the rapacious rule of the Robber Barons of
McKinley’s day.
The creation of a new political
oligarchy was to be based on the complete conquest of all
available levers of power and its ruthless use against
any source of resistance. The Republican leaders of both
Houses of Congress brooked no dissent. In the House, the rule
of Tom Delay was absolute [4], the Democrats were excluded
from participation at every possible occasion, and dissenters
within Republican ranks were penalized (while the venal sins,
financial or sexual, of those who remained faithful were
overlooked). “Earmarking” of projects for the favored meant
that the supposedly frugal, small-government Republicans
increased vastly the deficit, but this contradiction was
overlooked by the power-driven party loyalists. The
Republican-led Senate gave the President a blank check for
appointees, forgetting its constitutional duty to “advise and
consent.” When the Democrats dared object, the Republicans
threatened what they themselves called a “nuclear option” that
would destroy the rights of the minority. As a result, the
judiciary is now overloaded with life-tenured ideological
Republicans whose rulings have begun to roll back the gains of
the civil rights era while confirming the exorbitant claims of
executive power which is the capstone of the Bush edifice.[5]
More important than the
Republican smothering of Congress and the judiciary has been
the expanded power of the presidency. This had been the dream
of Dick Cheney since his days as White House chief of staff
under Gerald Ford when, in the wake of Nixon’s abuses [6], the
“Watergate Reforms” re-established the constitutional
equilibrium among the branches of government, particularly in
the form of Congressional and judicial oversight over the
presidency. Presidential power did not grow simply in
response to 9/11; Cheney had already refused to release the
names of those whom he was consulting with regard to the
reform of US energy policy. That was the first claim of
“executive privilege” with regard to the release of documents
or the testimony of administration personnel before
Congressional committee hearings. It has not been the last,
despite the Democrats’ retaking of Congress in 2006.
Another manifestation of this
omnivorous new executive branch can be seen in the scandalous
over-reaching of the Department of Justice, most baldly in the
nomination (and removal) of federal prosecutors and their
clearly political decisions as to whom to prosecute and whom
to ignore (for example, the former Democratic governor of
Alabama, Don Seligman, received a five year jail term on
charges of corruption for activities that, had he been a
Republican, would certainly have been ignored).
But enough. As Machiavelli might
say, if it is necessary to take power in such a way,
one might indeed imitate the deeds of this Prince, as one
should imitate those of Borgia, Sforza, even the lowly
Agathocles, described in the chapter titled “Of Those who Have
Attained the Position of Prince by Villainy.” But was it
necessary to follow this path in an America whose republican
spirit did not suddenly disappear on September 11 2001? And
was it wise? Could it work? After all, it should be
recalled, Machiavelli was a republican who understood the
limits as well as the need for power.
***
*** ***
The Bush overreaching
could not be maintained; the edifice began to crack, like the
dams that broke in New Orleans. The public that was
rendered skeptical by the aftermath of Katrina was long
weary of a military quagmire; many still remembered May 1,
2003, when the president-hero landed on the flight-deck of the
USS Abraham Lincoln under a sign “Mission Accomplished.” But
the mission was not just military; as in domestic affairs, the
Bush gang identified force with politics. Total victory
leaves you with no resources when the tide turns.
But the now nearly ubiquitous
desire for “change” that has been adopted by all of the
candidates, from both parties represents no alternative
project. What kind of change? By which participants (or
actors)? With what goals? Even the Republicans, especially
the Republicans who are worried about their future and have no
loyalty to a lame-duck president, want “change.”
American political parties have
traditionally been coalitions of interest groups. The “Reagan
coalition” that George W. Bush inherited is composed of three
distinct groups: the “values voters,” offended by secular
relativism and united by their religious evangelism; the
libertarians who want to cut taxes and keep government small;
and the former anti-communists allied with the
neo-conservatives who want to conserve American hegemony.
This coalition formed at a particular time (the 1980s) in
particular circumstances (a fossilized progressive Democratic
party that was prisoner to its own coalition members), and
around a particular leader (Reagan, and then George Bush as
the “anti-Clinton” in 2000, re-elected in 2004 on a platform
of fear).
As the 2008 primaries take shape,
it is evident that the coalition is breaking up. Each
component has its own candidate(s); the religious/values
candidate, Mike Huckabee, won the Iowa primary; the
tax-cutting small government forces managed a victory in
Michigan by Mitt Romney; while the aggressive foreign policy
faction could claim a victory with John McCain’s ability to
rally independent voters in New Hampshire—although Rudy
Giuliani, stressing his role as New York mayor during 9/11, is
competing for its support in Florida. The chances that no
candidate dominates the primaries, with unseemly bargaining at
the Convention (of the sort: “we’ll vote for your candidate if
ours becomes your Vice-President or Secretary of State…”) will
weaken the eventual candidate, who would be denounced as a
puppet by the opposing party.[7]
As for the Democrats—who, it
should be noted, seem certain to enlarge their majorities in
both Houses of Congress—there are two choices: transition or
transformation (or, as I put it in a recent French Op-Ed,
“reformer ou transformer"[8]). A third possibility would try
to renew the very old coalition, whose glory days date to the
New Deal that was cobbled together in the middle of the last
century, tries to reawaken the old ghosts who still remember
Franklin Roosevelt’s famous October 31, 1936 re-election
speech at Madison Square Garden, when he attacked those who
“had begun to consider the Government of the United States as
a mere appendage to their own affairs. We know now,” he
continued, “that Government by organized money is just as
dangerous as Government by organized mob. Never before in all
our history have these forces been so united against one
candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in their
hate for me-and I welcome their hatred."[9] The result could
be a renewed populism, personified by John Edwards. The
fighting spirit is admirable; but class warfare has little
resonance in a country whose history has remained colored by
its republican origins and its democratic social relations.
The Democrats who are concerned
above all to return to power (and to “change” losers of the
Bush years into the winners of tomorrow) tend to line up with
Hillary Clinton. Typical of her approach is a TV ad that ran
shortly before Christmas. Mrs. Clinton talks ostensibly to
herself, asking where to put the presents labeled “Universal
Health Care” or “Alternative Energy,” before unveiling a
surprise gift called “universal pre-K.” As New York Times
columnist Frank Rich points out (January 13, 2008) this
piecemeal approach to reform is typical of her campaign
director, Mark Penn, who recently explained his theory of
winning politics in a book called Microtrends. Penn’s
thesis, according to Rich, is that “there is no one America
anymore,” but rather “hundreds of Americas.” Penn, who has
kept his job as chief executive of the Public Relations firm
Burson-Marsteller, prides himself on “the niching of
America.” This is necessary, he claims, because “Americans
overwhelmingly favor small, reasonable ideas over big,
grandiose themes.” This progressive inversion of the old
Stalinist “sausage technique” might indeed insure the
transition to a Democratic victory; and it would certainly
inaugurate many piecemeal reforms, as in Mrs. Clinton’s ad.
But “small ideas” and acceptance of the idea that “there is no
one America anymore” are problematic recipes in a nation that
remembers (at least sometimes) its republican heritage while
desiring “major reforms” and a “brand-new” approach to
politics.
The other option places its bets
on a revival of the republican spirit. In the soaring
rhetoric of Barack Obama, who first came to public attention
in his 2004 Convention speech, one hears the rhetoric of the
Civil Rights Movement, the rhythmic hopes of the gospel, as
well as the rhetoric of the great Shakespearean theater. His
acceptance speech after his surprise victory in Iowa seemed to
echo the Bard’s Henry V addressing the “happy few” on St.
Crispin’s Day before the Battle of Agincourt. Appealing
precisely to the one America, preaching the need to overcome
the sharp-edged stalemate that has made politics into a dirty
word for many citizens, Obama seems to have struck a spark.
But where is the kindling? How will the fire be sustained?
How can the candidate of “hope” overcome the cool headed
practical reflections of older party regulars who prefer
Hillary Clinton as the candidate of “experience”?
With her back to the wall in New
Hampshire, Hillary Clinton put her foot in her mouth. In what
seemed to be a common sense remark, she pointed to what may
prove the crucial element in the renewal of American democracy
at the end of the Bush era. “Dr. King’s dream began to be
realized when President Johnson passed the Civil Rights Act,”
Mrs. Clinton said, “It took a president to get it done.”
While this was literally the case, there had been many
presidents prior to LBJ; and they did not “get it done.” One
could even say that it was only because of the Civil Rights
Movement that the president was able to act successfully.
Whether Mrs. Clinton’s insensitivity—which occurred at the
same moment that she showed exquisite sensitivity to her
female public, showing finally that she, too, had emotions
like the rest of us[10]—will cost her in electoral terms can
be left aside here; our concern is the future of American
democracy, not that of a candidate for its leadership, be she
a woman, or he an Afro-American.
The attractiveness of the Obama
candidacy lies in its post-racial nature. It is as if
the call of the Civil Rights Movement for integration
and equality among all Americans had been realized; the
old coalition politics, in which African Americans had become
merely another interest group wanting its share of the pie,
could finally be transcended. While Hillary Clinton’s victory
might break what she calls “the hardest glass ceiling,” it’s
not clear that she would inaugurate a post-feminist
era—which might not be a good thing! She is a first-class
politician whose victory, however, would be the triumph of
partisan politics over the hope of democratic renewal.
There was a revealing implication
in Mrs. Clinton’s insistence on the role of the president in
the realization of civil rights reform. When Lyndon Johnson
signed the Civil Rights Law, he told friends, “there goes the
South for a generation.” And he was right; the Republican
party conquest of the South, and Washington, began at that
moment. Some praise Johnson for putting the national interest
above partisan concerns. But, in spite of his tone-deafness
to movements of national liberation abroad, Johnson was a
politician who, like Machiavelli’s republican Prince, knew
that opportunity knocks only once. In that sense, he may
indeed be a kindred spirit to Barak Obama rather than Hillary
Clinton.[11]
“It won’t be easy… It won’t be
easy,” repeats Barack Obama at every recent speech. He’s
right. But when people try to explain to him that he’d be
better off remaining in the Senate, gaining experience and
reputation before leaping onto the national stage, his
response is more significant than he realizes. The moment for
action arises only once; the time has found its man, who can’t
shy away. Obama may have thought of Shakespeare’s Julius
Caesar (Act IV), which insists that “There is a tide in
the affairs of men / Which taken at the flood, leads on to
fortune; / Omitted, all the voyage of their life / Is bound in
shallows and in miseries.” But he of course does not cite
the author’s probable source—Machiavelli—even though he is in
fact applying the political teaching of the Florentine, who
wagered on virtu to vanquish the vicissitudes of
fortuna. It’s perhaps this old political
lesson—understood by the Elizabethan dramatist better than the
well-intentioned reformers—that suggests the possibility for
the renewal of a republic that had fallen prey to a fear
manipulated by political reactionaries.
This hope is bolstered by historical experience. As opposed
to the European model whose origins lie with the French
revolution—which had to seize state power and then use it to
remodel society in a way that would overcome the distinction
between the particular interests of society and the general
interest incarnated by the state—the Americans sought to
protect the autonomy of their social relations by creating
republican institutions whose universality would protect the
plurality of an active democratic society. The European model
is a democratic republic, a social democracy in which class
differences are leveled as far as possible; the American is a
republican democracy in which political institutions keep
alive the pluralism and pragmatism that insure the dynamism of
social relations. What appears to Obama’s critics[12] to be
the vague, merely rhetorical character of his campaign is from
this perspective its power. It is not necessary to be a poet
to recognize that words have a unique power just because they
create a shared world of meaning in which individuals find
themselves able to act together. Was that not, in the last
resort, the power of John F. Kennedy, to whom Obama is often
compared?
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