Sinn Fein party leader Gerry Adams’s
latest book on the fragile and fitful Northern Irish peace
process is subtitled “Making Peace in Ireland,” and the text
is prefaced by a Seamus Heaney poem:
History says, Don’t hope
On this side of the grave
But then, once in a lifetime
The tide of justice can rise up
and hope and history rhyme
So hope for a sea change
On the far side of revenge
Believe that farther shore
Is reachable from here
Believe in miracles and cures
and healing wells.
There is little more to be said in that poignant vein.
But poetry compresses experience and not even the hearty
injunctions in Rudyard Kipling’s “If” tell the anxious
reader how to achieve the ambitious moral goals urged upon
him. Likewise, Adams’s extremely detailed book gives such a
congested account of Provisional Sinn Fein’s journey through
the wilderness that it is difficult to wend one’s way
through all the thick word curtains of annotation. There are
striking passages of narrative clarity, though, obviously
only one partisan perspective is enthusiastically engaged.
These occasional morsels are very digestible but they are
buried in vast carcasses of connective tissue. His worthy
tome is, in a word, tiring (though not tiresome) to read.
Heaney’s poem, cited at the start, gives us some hope of
better prose around the bend when the eyes are weary and the
narrative bogs down. But, as I said, poetry compresses and
Gerry Adams, and his team of aides meticulously recording
every jot and tittle at meetings and events, have composed a
work dismayingly far removed from the realm of smooth,
well-paced narratives. Possibly, a gripping story, which the
peace process ought to be, was never Adams’s goal. This
imposing mass of cumulative minutes of meetings, encounters,
and Ard Feises (annual party congresses) inundates us with
information, some of which is forgettable, though much of
the remainder likely will nourish hardy historians and
biographers for the rest of the century.
Let us start with essential facts. Ireland is a small
island, 300 odd miles long and 150 miles wide, and
historically too close for comfort to Britain. Northern
Ireland consists of six counties of the province of Ulster.
Three further counties, including, oddly enough, the most
northerly, Donegal, are part of the Republic of Ireland, or
Eire. The seeds of rowdy Republican political tradition run
far back, beginning after the envied American and French
revolutions. The dominant strain of republicanism in
Ireland, it may surprise some readers to learn, was
Presbyterian, though, as in Washington, and Paris, the
leaders were probably deists or skeptics, like Thomas Paine.
Wolf Tone, the martyred helmsman of Irish republicanism,
uttered the oft-quoted nonsectarian aspiration “to
substitute the common name of Irishman, for Protestant,
Catholic and dissenter.” Tone’s valiant struggles, with
French help, ended miserably in both the defeat of his
French allies and of the popular 1798 rebellion: a bloody
affair resulting in a forest of gallows plus the 1800 Act of
Union, giving Ireland to England and adding a stripe to the
Union Jack.
The chief sign of Irish republicanism’s political
resurrection in the 19th century was the Fenian Brotherhood,
born out of the American Civil War (where many an Irish
recruit acquired military skills) and resulting in desultory
bombings, plottings, hangings, and deportations until the
rise in the 1880s of Charles Stewart Parnell, leader of the
Irish Home Rule Party in the House of Commons, Westminster.
Fraud and deceit, notorious in story and poetry led to his
downfall and to the end of what seemed like imminent Irish
home rule.
The bishops and their party
A tragic story made
A husband who betrayed his wife
And after that betrayed
But here’s another reason
For Parnell loved a lass
-W.B. Yeats
In 1905, the year of the Liberal Party landslide in Britain,
Arthur Griffith in Ireland devised the name or slogan, Sinn
Fein (pronounced “shin fain”) which means “us” or “we
ourselves.” The name came into popular use after the 1918
election in the British Isles, which registered a huge Irish
majority for Irish independence. It was at this turbulent
time, the threshold of the Anglo-Irish war (Black and Tan
War, 1919-1920), that the term Irish Republican Army (IRA)
arose. The “diehard” republican opposition to the Irish Free
State compromise government, which took power in the
southern twenty-six counties in 1923, was known as the
Irregulars and only gradually became widely known as the
IRA. They were rapidly out-gunned, out-maneuvered and
defeated, but not stamped out.
So former “irregulars” leader Eamon de Valera’s somewhat
theological evasion of the British ”oath of allegiance”
enabled him to enter the Irish Parliament, and take power in
1932. The years that followed until the Second World
War—known in neutral Ireland quaintly as “the
Emergency”—reshaped the IRA, which faced down a local Irish
fascist “blue shirt” bid for power and its support for
Franco in Spain. The IRA, a proscribed organization, now
tended toward a nationalist-republican split among its
fractious members, but somehow held together. Many members
fought in Spain and became militant but parliamentarian
socialists, following the guidance of the writings of James
Connally, the executed socialist leader of the Citizens Army
in the 1916 rebellion. During the war (or Emergency) years
1939-45 the IRA in practice became split doctrinally between
socialist republicans and physical force nationalists
although there was no formal secession. Despite often sharp
disagreement among old (and new) comrades, friendly, if
testy, bonds maintained the underground movement.
Through ensuing changes in Irish government, including one
in which ex-IRA Chief of Staff Sean MacBride became minister
for foreign affairs in 1948, the IRA continued to wind down
its reliance on physical force and to concentrate instead on
a socialist reform policy, eventually abjuring militarism
altogether in the early 1960s. Meanwhile, in the six
separated counties of sectarian Ulster, a satrapy of
conservative Westminster, the Catholic, or more properly
Nationalist middle classes were inspired by and imitated the
tactics of Martin Luther King, rather than Wolfe Tone, and
started a risky round of protest marching from Belfast to
the Burntollet Bridge. The savage and bloody repression of
these marches led to a plain need for, as the republican
community saw it, self-protection. Since the “official” IRA
had disposed of its dwindling arms stock and was caught
empty-handed, a new and somewhat naively nationalist
offspring of nationalist defense was born: the Provisional
IRA, known in the back streets as “provies.”
As its bloody but unavoidable guerrilla campaign was waged,
a public organ was established to formulate policy and act
as spokesman, Provisional Sinn Fein. The “official IRA,” now
pledged to political and not military action, was known as
“the stickies” after the self-sticking emblem of the Easter
Lily, sold in the streets by supporters, and for long years
the symbol of the Easter Rebellion of 1916. The Provies
broke away from the official IRA (who go uncited in this
book’s index) over 1969-1970. The official IRA was always a
mixed religious or non-religious body and an all-Ireland
clandestine organization. In the twenty-six counties of the
Republic the Official IRA, after calling its unilateral
ceasefire in 1972, became parliamentary and re-dubbed itself
Sinn Fein, the Workers’ Party, and finally in the 1980s just
the Workers’ Party. The Provisional IRA, which began as
groups of vigilantes, gained in strength and wealth from
contributions from the USA, local “taxes,” and collections
on paynights in Irish working people’s pubs in Great
Britain. Adams was an early recruit.
After thirty years of guerrilla warfare and hundreds of
atrocities and horrors on all sides, a sort of stalemate was
quite clearly apparent to Adams, as well as any other
unblinkered politician, and the Good Friday Agreement was
mooted, backed by the governments of Britain and Ireland
with the indispensable help of the Clinton administration.
This scheme would allow for a plan for a joint British-Irish
administration of a revived local government—prorogued in
1972—for the six counties of Northern Ireland with a mixture
of Unionist and nationalist ministers, elected locally.
There was a highly promising start to the process, which
seemed to work for a while, but intransigence by more
extreme Unionists caused it to collapse. Tony Blair, the
British prime minister, coaxed and probably bullied a bit
and up to the end of this book by Adams, it seemed likely
that a “power sharing executive” (first launched in 1974 and
ended quickly by a loyalist strike) might be relaunched in
2003.
There is always hope. But the Rev. Ian Paisley’s fiery “not
an inch” attitude has been the reigning extremist Unionist
belief since Protestant Northern Ireland leader Edmund
Carson uttered that chilly phrase in 1913. The adamant
resistance of the Unionist hard core brought about the
partition of Ireland and has its roots in the decaying
compost of bigotry. Unfortunately, this book was barely off
the printing press when low-turnout by a weary public in a
north of Ireland election produced electoral results that
caused everything to collapse. The implacable Democratic
Unionist Party led by Paisley finally became the biggest
Unionist party, outpolling David Trimble’s Ulster Unionist
Party, itself riven by internal extremists, and which had
held out the prospect of reaching a reasoned arrangement of
fair government with the nationalists. All hopes of power
sharing disappeared overnight.
In my compressed, if not poetic, account of this whole sad
story, as Adams’s volume relates it, much was omitted or
underemphasized: important aspects such as the role of the
Social Democratic Party, and Labour Party and its courageous
leader John Hume, who doggedly talked Sinn Fein into
accepting the concept of political compromise. Among the
great cataracts of details of policy and decisions flooding
the pages, many telling episodes also emerge: the exploits
of the Army Intelligence Agency which penetrated and aided
the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, the largest of several
deadly loyalist paramilitary organizations, which curiously
get little press) and its deals with the South African arms
manufacturers; the exploits of army agents and spies; and
the UDA murder of Paddy Finucane, the human rights lawyer,
filled with bullets before his horrified family as they sat
down to Sunday dinner.
Adams’s book relates many more such awful incidents, often
with names and their seamy connections supplied, providing
they incriminate the authorities, apparent or secret, who
indeed have a lot to answer for in Northern Ireland.
Bombings and shootings by the Provisional IRA, however, are
handled with the most conspicuous discretion. This is all
too understandable, but it makes for very bad history.
Nonetheless, for what it offers from an essential
participant’s perspective, we should be grateful for this
account of the tediously and painfully slow development
toward the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, and one hopes that
the good Rev. Paisley’s religious and political bigotry will
somehow be circumvented in the near future.